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ABSTRACT
Few people would disagree with the proposition that horizontal mergers
have the potential to restrict output and raise consumer prices. In
contrast, there is much less agreement about the anti-competitive effects of
vertical mergers. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical
model showing how vertical integration changes the nature of competition in
upstream and downstream markets and identifying conditions under which market
foreclosure will be a consequence or even a purpose of such integration. In
contrast to much of the literature, we do not restrict upstream and
downstream firms to particular contractual arrangements, but instead allow
firms to choose from a full set of contractual arrangements both when
integrated and when not. We also allow non-integrated firms to respond
optimally to the integration decisions of other firms, either by remaining
nonintegrated, exiting the industry or integrating too (i.e. bandwagoning).
In a final section we use our analysis to shed some light on a number of
prominent vertical merger cases, involving computer reservation systems for
airlines, the cement industry and the St. Louis Terminal Railroad.
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1. Introduction.
Few people would disagree with the proposition that horizontal mergers
have the potential to restrict output and raise consumer prices. In
contrast, there is much less agreement about the anti-competitive effects of
vertical mergers. Some commentators have argued that a purely vertical
merger will not affect a firm's monopoly power, since a merger of an upstream
and a downstream firm, each of which controls, say, 10% of its respective
market, does not change market shares: other firms continue to possess 90%
of each market after the merger just as before. Others have responded by
developing models in which vertical integration can lead to the foreclosure
of competition in upstream or downstream markets. These models, however,
1The authors are grateful to Mike Gibson and Dimitri Vayanos for very able
research assistance; and to Steve Salop, Mike Whinston, Richard Zeckhauser and
the discussants for helpful comments, and to the MIT Energy Lab, the
Guggenheim Foundation, the Olin Foundation, the National Science Foundation,
the Taussig Visiting Professorship at Harvard and the Marvin Bower Fellowship
at Harvard Business School, for financial support for the period over which
this research was conducted.
See, in particular, Bork (1978).
rely on particular assumptions about contractual arrangements between
nonintegrated firms (e.g. that pricing must be linear), or about the ability
of integrated firms to make commitments (e.g. that an integrated supplier can
commit not to undercut a rival). Thus at this stage the debate about the
conditions under which vertical mergers are anti-competitive is far from
settled.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model showing how
vertical integration changes the nature of competition in upstream and
downstream markets and identifying conditions under which market foreclosure
will be a consequence and/or a purpose of such integration. In contrast to
much of the literature, we do not restrict upstream and downstream firms to
particular contractual arrangements, but instead allow firms to choose from a
full set of contractual arrangements both when integrated and when not (so,
for example, two part tariffs are permitted).3 We also allow non-integrated
firms to respond optimally to the integration decisions of other firms,
either by remaining nonintegrated, exiting the industry or integrating too
(i.e. bandwagoning). In Section 7 we use our analysis to shed some light on
a number of prominent vertical merger cases, involving computer reservation
systems for airlines, the cement industry, and the St. Louis Terminal
Railroad.
We follow the recent literature on ownership and residual control
rights in the way we formalize vertical integration. We assume that the
upstream and downstream firms do not know ex-ante which type of intermediate
3This means that the elimination of the double marginalization of prices is
not a motive for integration in our model. For a discussion of this issue,
see Tirole [1988].
good will be the appropriate one to trade in the future and that the large
number of potential types makes it too costly to write contingent forward
contracts ex-ante. As a result, the only way to influence ex-post behavior
is through the allocation of residual rights of control over assets (as in
Grossman-Hart (1986)). Moreover, we take the point of view that the shift
in residual control rights that occurs under integration permits profit-
sharing between upstream and downstream units and that as a consequence all
conflicts of interest about prices and trading policies are removed. In this
respect, vertical integration does not differ formally from a profit-sharing
scheme between independent contractors. Profit-sharing may be difficult to
implement in the absence of integration, however, because independent units
can divert money and misrepresent profits. In contrast, the owner of a
subordinate unit, because he has residual rights of control over the unit's
assets, may be able to prevent diversion and enforce profit-sharing.5
4 For discussions of how this approach compares with others on integration, see
Hart [1989] and Holmstrbm-Tirole [1989a].
5On this, see Williamson [1985], and, for formal models, Hart [1988].
Hblmstrom-Tirole [1989a] and Riordan [1989]. As an (extreme) example,
consider an independent unit A that has signed a profit-sharing agreement
with another firm B. One way A can misrepresent and divert its profits is by
purchasing a (possibly useless) input at an inflated price from another
company in which A's owners have an interest. It may be hard for B to write
an enforceable contract ex-ante to prevent such a diversion, even though B
may be well aware of the practice ex-post (the information that the input is
over-priced is observable, but not verifiable). On the other hand, if A and
B are integrated, B can ex-post refuse A's managers permission to spend
company resources on the expensive input, thus effectively blocking the
transaction. (This is because B now possesses residual rights of control
over company A's resources by virtue of integration.)
Of course, diversion problems are not completely eliminated by
integration. In particular, if B owns A, B can use its residual control
rights to divert money from A. Note, however, that as long as B diverts on a
proportionate basis from both units A and B -- and as long as this diversion
is less than 100% -- A's subordinate manager can be given a compensation
package which is some fraction of A and B's joint profit. Given this, A's
Although integration removes conflicts of interest over pricing and
trading policies, it is accompanied by costs. First, after integration, a
subordinate manager may have lower ex-ante incentives to come up with
productive ideas to reduce production costs or to raise quality because this
investment is expropriated ex-post by the owner of the firm.6 Second, there
may be a loss in information about the subordinate's performance, and
therefore lower incentives to make ex-ante or ex-post improvements, because
vertical integration reduces or eliminates the fluidity of the market for the
stock of the now subordinate unit.7 Third, there may be legal costs
associated with the merger. We do not explicitly formalize these costs of
integration, although it is easy to do so. Instead for our purposes it will
be enough to 'represent them by a fixed amount E.
subordinate manager will have an incentive to choose pricing and trading
policies that are in the interest of the company as a whole.
Note that another argument can be given as to why a merger reduces
conflicts of interest over prices and trading policies. Under integration, a
subordinate manager will act in the interest of the parent company since
otherwise he or she will be dismissed. In contrast the pressure on the
manager of an independent unit to act in the interest of another independent
contractor is less since the only sanction available to the independent
contractor is to sever the whole relationship with the unit (i.e. the
contractor can't fire the unit's manager alone). On this, see Hart and Moore
(1988).
See Grossman-Hart [1986] or Hart-Moore [1988]. We assume that effort costs
cannot be reimbursed as part of a profit-sharing scheme.
7See Holmstr6m-Tirole [1989b].
la. Description of the Model
Our basic model consists of two potential suppliers or upstream firms
(UI and U2 ) and two potential buyers or downstream firms (D1 and D2 ). The
downstream firms compete on the product market and sell perfect substitutes.
The upstream firms produce the same intermediate good at constant (although
possibly different) marginal costs, cl, c2, subject possibly to a capacity
constraint.
We will in fact develop three variants of the basic model, each of
which illustrates a different motive for integration. Variant one (which we
call Ex-Post Monopolization) focusses on the incentive of a relatively
efficient upstream firm to merge with a downstream firm in order to restrict
output in the downstream market. To understand the idea, consider the
special case where one of the upstream firms, U2 say, has infinite marginal
cost. It is sometimes claimed that in this case U1 would never have an
incentive to merge with a downstream firm, D1 say, since U1 is already a
monopolist in the upstream market. We argue that this claim is false unless
(enforceable) exclusive dealing contracts are feasible (or unless Ul's offers
to D1 and D2 are public). In particular, in the absence of exclusive dealing
contracts, U1 has an incentive to supply both D1 and D2 and, in so doing, to
produce more than the monopoly output level. For example, suppose U1 tries
m
to monopolize the downstream market by selling the monopoly output q to D1
The model could easily be generalized to the case of more than two upstream
or downstream firms, however.
9For example, as Posner and Easterbrook (1981, p.870) have written: "[T]here
is only one monopoly profit to be made in a chain of production".
for a lump-sum fee equal to monopoly profit. It is not an equilibrium for D1
to accept such an offer since D1 knows that U1 has an incentive to sell an
additional amount to D2, thus causing D1 to nake a loss. On the other hand,
i m
suppose U1 tries to monopolize the downstream market by offering 2 q to each
of DI , D2 at a fee equal to half of monopoly profit. It is not an equilibrium
for U1 to make and DI, D2 to accept these offers either, because if D1 , say,
is expected to accept, U1 has an incentive to increase its supply to D2 above
1 m
q , and D1 again makes a loss.
Integration can be a way round the inability of U1 to restrict output.
If U1 and D1 merge, U1 has no incentive to supply D2 anymore. The reason is
that under integration U1 and D1's profits are shared and every unit sold to
D2 reduces U1 - Dl's combined profit by depressing price. Thus the unique
equilibrium now is for U1 to supply q to D1 and zero to D2.
One might ask why U1 could not achieve the same outcome by writing an
exclusive dealing contract with D 
. 
There are several answers to this.
First, exclusive dealing may be unenforceable for informational reasons. In
particular, it may be difficult for D1 to monitor and/or control shipments by
U1 to other parties without having residual rights of control over U 's
assets (including buildings, trucks, inventories). And even if shipments can
be monitored, if there are third parties outside the industry with whom U1
can realize gains from trade and who could bootleg Ul's product to D2, then a
strict enforcement of exclusive dealing requires not trading with these third
parties, which may prove costly. Second, exclusive dealing may be
unenforceable for legal reasons: the courts have taken a harsh stance on
those exclusive dealing contra:ts they think may result in foreclosure.
In addition, we shall see that exclusive dealing, even if it is
10
feasible, is not generally a perfect substitute for integration. In
particular, if U2 's supply costs are finite rather than infinite, then it is
no longer optimal for an integrated U1 - D1 pair not to supply D2 at all.
Instead U1 - D1 will want to offer D2 the same amount that U2 would offer D2,
but at a slightly lower price (see Section 3). An exclusive dealing contract
will not achieve this. Moreover, a contract that limits the amount that U1
can sell D2 may be very difficult to enforce: given that U1 is supplying D2
anyway, it may be hard for DI to verify that supplies equal 100, say, rather
11
than 200. Integration avoids this problem: profit-sharing between U 1 and
D1 means that U1 automatically finds it in its interest to supply the
profit-maximizing level (and quality of service) to D2.
In extensions of this first variant, we consider the possibility that
it is not known in advance whether U1 or U2 is the more efficient supplier,
and that the upstream and downstream firms must make ex-ante
industry-specific investments prior to trading ex-post. We show that the
more efficient (in a stochastic sense) upstream firm will have a greater
incentive to merge to monopolize the market ex-post. Also, if U - D1 merge,
D2 s profits will typically fall since if U 1 turns out to be the more
efficient firm ex-post, U1 will channel supplies towards D1 at the expense of
D2 . This fall in D2's profits may cause it to stop investing (or exit the
industry). To the extent that exit by D2 reduces U2's profit by lowering the
total demand for its product, U2 may have an incentive to rescue D2 by
10An analysis of exclusive dealing contracts is contained in Appendix 3.
T1 he enforcement problem becomes even greater if U1 wants to commit itself
not to supply D2 with aualitv of service above U2's.
merging with it and paying part of its investment cost (via profit-sharing).
In other words, bandwagoning may occur.
This first variant assumes that upstream firms engage in Bertrand
competition in the price/quantity offers they make to downstream firms. Our
second variant (which we call Scarce Needs) supposes instead that upstream
and downstream firms bargain over the gains from trade in such a way that
each upstream firm obtains on average a positive share of these gains. In
addition we now assume for simplicity that cl - c2: the upstream firms are
equally efficient.
Under these conditions, there is a new motive for integration: an
upstream firm may merge with a downstream firm to ensure that the downstream
firm purchases its supplies from this upstream firm rather than from others.
In particular, if U1 - D1 merge, then, rather than D1 sometimes buying input
from U1 and sometimes from U2 as under nonintegration, D1 will now buy all
its input all the time from its partner U1. Thus U1 gains a valuable trading
opportunity and U2 loses one. ("Scarce Needs" refers to the fact that D1 and
D2 have limited input requirements.)
If U2 remains in the industry (continues to invest), the only effect of
the merger is to increase U1 - DI 's share of industry profit and reduce U2
D2's. In particular, there is no ex-post monopolization effect in this
second variant: given that U2 is as efficient as Ul, there is no reason for
U1 to restrict its supplies to D2 since U2 will make up the difference
anyway. However, if the reduction in U2's profit causes U2 to quit the
industry, this leaves U1 as the only supplier (we refer to this as ex-ante
monopolization) and, given that it is merged with D1, U1 will be able to use
this power to completely monopolize the market ex-post (as part of a merged
firm it has no incentive to supply D2 ). Thus total quantity supplied will
fall and the price consumers pay will rise.
Bandwagon does not occur in equilibrium in this second variant.
However, U2 - D2 may try to pre-empt U1 - D1 by merging first. We show that
in real time the lower investment cost upstream firm will win this
pre-emption game by merging prematurely.
Our last variant reverses the role of upstream and downstream firms (and
goes under the heading of Scarce Supplies). Now we suppose that the upstream
firms are capacity-constrained relative to downstream firms' needs, with
upstream and downstream firms again bargaining over the terms of trade.
Under these conditions, a third incentive to integrate arises: a downstream
firm and an upstream firm may merge to ensure that the upstream firm channels
its scarce supplies to its downstream partner rather than to other downstream
firms.
If U1 - D1 merge, D2 suffers, since under nonintegration D2 obtains
some profit from being able to purchase Ul's supplies, whereas under
integration U1 channels all its supplies to D . The fall in D2's profit may
cause D2 to quit the industry. In this case, U2 's profit will also fall
since U2 faces only one purchaser for its output: D1 . Hence U2 may in turn
cease to invest. If this happens, capacity will be eliminated from the
market, consumer price will rise, and the effect of the U1 - D1 merger will
have been to monopolize the market ex-ante.
In order to avoid exit by D2 , U2 may merge with it. Thus, as in the
first variant, bandwagon is a possible outcome. Also U2 - D2 may try to
pre-empt U1 - D1 by merging first. We show that pre-emption game will lead
to premature merger by U1 - D1 or U 2 - D2.
A summary of our three variants is given in Chart 1:
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a) As long as integrated U does not operate at full capacity. Otherwise the
integrated D may still buy some supplies from unintegrated U.
b) As long as integrated D does not operate at full capacity. Otherwise,
the integrated U may sell some of its supplies to a nonintegrated D.
c) If the downstream firms have the same demands. If they have different
demands, say, because they have different storage or marketing
facilities, then the same industry structures as in the scarce supplies
case may emerge.
1h. Welfare Analysis of Vertical Mergers
Our theory has a number of implications for the welfare analysis of
vertical mergers. In our model, there are three sources of social loss from
mergers and two sources of social gain. First, in variant one, a merger by U1
- D1 raises consumer prices to the extent that it allows U1 - D1 to monopolize
the market ex-post. This reduces the sum of consumer and producer surplus for
the usual reasons. Second, in all three variants of the model, a merger by U1
- D1 may cause exit by either U2 , D2 or both. This ex-ante monopolization
effect again gives U1 - D1 greater market power ex-post, causing consumer
prices to rise and consumer plus producer surplus to fall. Third, mergers
involve incentive and legal costs, which we have represented by a fixed amount
E.
Offsetting these losses are two potential gains from mergers. First, a
merger by U1 - D1 that causes exit by U2 and/or D2 leads to a saving in
investment costs. To the extent that these costs were incurred by U2 and D2
to increase their aggregate profit at the expense of U1 - D1, with no price
effects, this represents a social gain. In other words, a merger-induced exit
can be beneficial to the extent that it leads to a reduction in rent-seeking
behavior.
Second, there may be pure efficiency gains from mergers. In all three
variants of the model, upstream and downstream firms make ex-ante
investments. Although these investments are taken to be industry-specific,
given that the industry is imperfectly competitive, they have many of the
characteristics of the relationship-specific investments emphasized by
Williamson (1975, 1985) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) (see also
Grossman and Hart (1986)). In particular, an upstream firm, say, might be
unwilling to invest given that the absence of a perfectly competitive market
for its product can cause it to be held up. Thus one motive for a merger
between an upstream and downstream firm may be to encourage investments by
reducing such hold-up problems. A merger carried out for these reasons will
increase competition and reduce consumer prices. (For simplicity, our formal
model supposes that firms are prepared to invest under nonintegration and so
hold-up problems are not a motive for merger; it would be easy to relax this
assumption however.)
Given these conflicting welfare effects, it is hard to come up with
clear-cut prescriptions for anti-trust policy towards vertical mergers. Any
industry in which investments are industry-specific rather than
relationship-specific (the various cases we consider in Section 7 all fit into
this category) is either competitive -- in which case neither hold-up nor
foreclosure effects should be important and vertical mergers should be
irrelevant; or imperfectly competitive -- in which case both hold-up and
foreclosure effects are potentially important and it is hard to distinguish
between the two. Our theory can, however, give some guidance as to when the
foreclosure effects are likely to be significant and the onus should be on the
merging firms to show that there are substantial efficiency gains offsetting
the anti-competitive effects. According to our models, restriction of
competition is most likely to be a factor when the merging firms are efficient
(have low marginal costs or investment costs) or are large (have high
capacities) relative to non-merging firms. Since there is no strong reason to
think that hold-up problems will be more serious for efficient or large firms,
the theory suggests that vertical mergers involving efficient or large firms
should be subject to particular scrutiny by the anti-trust authorities.
In addition, the theory suggests that the anti-trust authorities should
only be suspicious of vertical mergers that significantly harm rivals
(possibly causing exit). Thus a merger between an upstream and a downstream
firm that have had substantial dealings with outside firms is potentially
more damaging than one between firms that have primarily traded with each
other since, in the latter case, the foreclosure effect on rivals will be
small.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2.
The first variant is explored in Sections 3 and 4, the second in Section 5 and
the third in Section 6. (Section 4 is considerably more involved than the
other sections and the reader may well wish to skip this on first reading.)
Section 7 applies the analysis to various industries and Section 8 relates our
work to the literature -- in particular to the paper of Ordover, Saloner and
Salop [OSS, 1990]. We argue that their model is concerned more with the use
of different types of exclusive dealing contracts to restrict competition than
with vertical integration per se. In addition our predictions about which
mergers will occur differ from OSS's in a number of important ways. Finally,
the appendices contain technical material and an analysis of exclusive dealing
contracts.
2. The model.
There are two potential suppliers or upstream firms (U1 and U2 ) and two
potential buyers or downstream firms (D1 and D2). The downstream firms
compete on the product market and sell perfect substitutes. The demand
function for the final good is Q - D(p) with concave demand p - P(Q). The
upstream firms produce the same intermediate good at constant marginal cost c.
1
(i-1,2). In Section 6, we will introduce capacity constraints for the
upstream firms, but in Sections 3, 4 and 5, no such constraint exists. The
intermediate good is transformed into the final good by the downstream firms
on a one-for-one basis at zero marginal cost (the downstream firms are thus
symmetric).
We will assume that the upstream marginal costs c. are sufficiently high
relative to the downstream marginal cost (zero) that if the downstream firms
D1 and D2 have purchased quantities Q1 and Q2 in the "viable range," the Nash
equilibrium in prices in the downstream market has both firms charge the
market clearing price P(Q) where Q - QI+Q2 (see Tirole [1988, chapter 5] for
more detail). For this reason the Cournot revenue functions, profit
functions and reaction curves are relevant. Define:
A A
r(q,q) - P(q+q)q,
i A A
r (q,q) - (P(q+q)-c.)q
and
Ri(q) = arg max n (q,q).
q
i
We assume that r is strictly concave in q and twice differentiable. R.(q) is
1
then unique and differentiable. As is well-known, the slope of a reaction
curve is between minus one and zero:
dR.
-1 < -~- < 0.
dq
We assume that for any costs (c1,c2), the reaction curves R1 and R2 have a
unique intersection (ql(c1 ,c2), q"(c 1 ,c2 )); i.e. the Cournot equilibrium is
unique. We also introduce the monopoly output qm(c) and monopoly profit m (c)
- max ((P(Q)-c)Q) - (P(q (c))-c)qm(c) at cost c. Last, for technical
Q
convenience, we assume that firm i's marginal revenue is convex in firm j's
output (as is the case for instance for linear demand curves); this assumption
is needed only in the first variant and is a sufficient condition for
contracts that induce random behavior by downstream firms not to be optimal
for upstream firms.
The industry evolves in two stages: ex-ance and ex-post. The ex-ante
stage includes the decisions before uncertainty resolves: vertical
integration and industry-specific investments.
The uncertainty is two-dimensional. First, the firms do not know
ex-ante which intermediate good will be the appropriate one to trade ex-post.
We adopt the Grossman-Hart [1986] methodology of presuming that the large
number of potential technologies or products ex-ance make it too costly to
write complete contracts and that the only way to influence ex-post behavior
is through the allocation of residual rights of control over assets. Second,
the firms may not know which marginal cost structure (C1 ,C2 ) to supply the
relevant product will prevail. Rather, they have a prior or cumulative
distribution functions F1(C I ) and F2(c 2 ) on [c,c]; for simplicity cl and c2
are drawn from independent distributions.
The timing is as follows:
ED-ANTE STAGE
Step 1 (vertical integration). First, firms decide whether to integrate
vertically. Antitrust statutes prevent any merger with a horizontal element.
They thus allow only mergers between a U and a D, as a firm cannot include the
two upstream units or the two downstream units. Assuming that the four
parties are still active after the investment/exit stage (see step 2), four
industry structures may emerge:
0 NI (non-integration): All four parties are separately run.
N PI1 (U1-D1 integrated): firms U1 and D1 have merged, firms U2 and D2
remain independent (without loss of generality we can assume that U. merges
1
with D. as the two downstream firms are symmetric).
N PI2 (U2 -D2 integrated): only firms U2 and D2 have merged.
a FI (full integration): U1 and D1 have merged and so have U2 and D2 . We
will later say that the industry has experienced "bandwagon."
We also want to study the possibility of ex-ance monopolization in which
vertical integration by a U and a D triggers exit by the other D, the other U
i i i
or by both. We will denote these industry structures by Md , M, and Mud
i
respectively; for instance Md means that the integration of U. and D. has
1 1
triggered exit of D. and thus the (ex-ante) monopolization of the downstream
market (but not of the upstream market).
Step 2 (investment/exit). After choosing whether to integrate, the U and D
units commit industry-specific investments: 0 or I for upstream units, 0 or
J for downstream units. Investing 0 implies that the unit is not able to
trade in the ex-post stage and thus exits. A unit that invests is able to
trade ex-post. Investments are non-contractible and are thus private costs
to the parties that commit them, in the tradition of the bilateral monopoly
paradigms of Williamson [1975, 1985] and Grossman-Hart [1986] (with the
particularity that investments are industry-specific rather than
firm-specific). Under integration, however, an implication of our
profit-sharing assumption Al below is that these investment costs can be
internalized between the merging parties. At the end of step 2, the industry
structure is one of (NI, PI1, PI2 , FI) (if all units have invested) or (Mu,
Md, d ) (if integration between U. and D. has triggered exit of U., D. ord ud 1 1 j 3
both -- the other configurations will be irrelevant under our assumptions).
EX-POST STAGE
Step 3 (resolution of uncertainty). At the beginning of the ex-post stage,
all parties learn the relevant product to trade. They also learn the upstream
marginal costs (c1,c2) to produce this product. There is no asymmetry of
information (all parties know the marginal costs as well as the demand curve).
Steps 4 and 5 (Contract offers and acceptances). The upstream and downstream
firms contract about how much of the intermediate good to trade. The variant
of Sections 3 and 4 and those of Sections 5 and 6 differ in the nature of
competition between the U. The first variant presumes Bertrand competition
while the other two allow a more even distribution of bargaining power between
the upstream and downstream firms.
Step 6 (production and payments): Outputs of intermediate good specified by
contracts as well as internal orders are produced and delivered. Payments
are made by the downstream firms to the upstream firms.
Step 7 (final product market competition): D1 and D2 transform the
intermediate good into final product (at zero marginal cost) and sell their
outputs Q1 and Q2 at price P(Q1+Q2). [As noted above, it is optimal for them
to do so assuming that they learn each other's output before choosing their
prices and cl and c2 are sufficiently large.]
Let us return to the ex-ante stage.
We make the following assumptions about the consequences of vertical
integration, a justification for which was given in the Introduction.
Al. Integration between a U and a D results in their sharing profits ex-post
(this is the benefit of integration). This leads to the removal of all
conflicts of interest about prices and trading policies (however, conflicts
12over effort may remain; see A2).A subtlety implicit in (Al) should be noted. What is actually being assumed
is that under integration profits of the parent and subsidiary are commingled
in such a way that profit-sharing is inevitable. In other words, the previous
arrangement whereby the manager of the subsidiary (resp. the parent) is paid
according to the subsidiary's (resp. parent's) profit, is no longer feasible.
(Al) is, of course extreme, but it does seem reasonable to suppose that it is
harder to identify the performances of the parent and subsidiary under
integration than under nonintegration. Note that most of our results seem
likely to generalize to the case where conflicts of interest over prices and
trading policies are reduced even if not eliminated under integration.
An implication of (Al) is that it does not matter which is the parent
company and which is the subordinate company in a merger (i.e. it doesn't
A2. Integration between a U and a D involves a loss in efficiency equal to a
fixed number E : 0 (this is the cost of integration). 1 3
We also make the following assumptions on the merger game:
A3: U. can merge with D. only.
Assumption A3 is made for convenience. Allowing an upstream firm, say,
to bargain with several downstream firms raises some thorny issues related to
antitrust. What would happen under the antitrust statutes if both downstream
firms agreed to merge with the same upstream firm? If we assume that an
upstream firm can negotiate with a single downstream firm, A3 involves no
loss of generality because the downstream firms are symmetric.14 We will
further assume that U.-D. take the optimal merger decision for them. The
matter whether the upstream firm buys the downstream firm or vice versa).
This simple view of mergers suffices for the analysis presented here, but we
should emphasize that the identity of the owning party does matter under more
general conditions. See Grossman-Hart [1986] or Hart-Moore [1988] for a
discussion.
1 3As noted in the introduction, one component of the cost of integration is
the loss due to a subordinate manager's dulled incentives. One case
consistent with our hypothesis that E is a fixed number independent of the
rest of the model is where the subordinate's dulled incentives concern
activities having to do with the reduction of fixed (as opposed to marginal)
production costs and the supply of goods to third parties (firms outside the
industry).
14Assumption A3 does have one important implication, however: it rules out the
possibility of extortion by the upstream firms. For instance, it might be the
case that the sum of U1 and D1's profit falls if they integrate, and yet D1
accepts a low offer from U1 to merge because of Ul's threat to merge with D2
and foreclose D1 at the ex-post stage.
distribution of the gains from merging between them depends on their relative
bargaining power, and will not be investigated here as it does not affect
industry structure and performance. 1 5
A4: Integration is irreversible.
Divestiture is ruled out by assumption A4. In practice, divestiture is
costly, because some of the integration costs are sunk and because new costs
are incurred. However, assumption A4 would be unduly restrictive in
industries in which demand and cost conditions change dramatically over time.
Allowing integration and disintegration to study the industry integration
cycle is an important item on the research agenda, for which our model is
amenable, but it is outside the scope of this paper.
A5: If U. and D. integrate, U. and D. can follow suit before step 2
(immediate response).
1 5As we shall see, a merger between U. and D. will often hurt U. and/or D..
One possibility we do not allow is that U. or D. bribe U. - D. not to merge.
There are two justifications for ignoring this. First, such a bribe might be
viewed with suspicion by the anti-trust authorities. Second, there may be
round-about ways in which U. and D. can merge (e.g. by forming a holding
1 1
company that owns both U. and D.) so as to evade a contract committing them1 2
not to combine. Note that this position is not inconsistent with the view
that the anti-trust authorities can prohibit mergers. There might be enough
evidence that the formation of a holding company, say, amounted to a merger
for a court to rule against such a holding company in an antitrust case, but
not enough evidence for a court to make such a ruling in a breach of contract
case.
This assumption deserves some clarification. It states that firms can
react quickly to their rivals' integration decision. Formally, A5 corresponds
to the following "reduced form merger game" within Step 1: First, the Ui
simultaneously decide whether to integrate. Second, if U. has integrated and
U has not, Uj gets a chance to respond (but the firms cannot integrate in
this "second period of step 1" if none has integrated in the "first period").
The reduced form merger game is not rich enough to depict some
interesting situations. Suppose for instance that if one of the U merges,
the unintegrated D exits; it may be the case that the reduced form merger
game has two equilibria: "U1 integrates, U2 does not" and "U2 integrates, U1
does not." Both to select between the two equilibria and to give a more
realistic picture of merger dynamics, we also develop a continuous-time
version of the merger game. Suppose that time is continuous, and that at
each instant there is a new trading dimension ("product" in our model) to
contract on. Contacting must be done just before trading. Similarly
investment must be committed continuously in order for the firms to keep
abreast of industry developments (i.e., to avoid exit: we suppose that once a
unit has stopped investing it cannot come back). The profits mentioned in the
paper are then flow profits; E is the present discounted value of the
E1
integration cost (it can be though of as being equal to E0 + - where EO is
the upfront integration cost (legal fees, say), E1 is the flow loss of
incentives and r is the rate of interest). In this continuous time
framework, the strategic variable is the date of integration. The loss for
U. to integrating just after U. compared to integrating simultaneously is
negligible, because the loss in flow profit is small (infinitesimal) relative
to present values of profits. We adopt the convention that the market
"opens" at date 0. That is, the flow investment is incurred and the flow
profits are received at each instant from date 0 on. However, we let firms
incur the integration cost before date 0 if they so wish, in order to allow
preemption.
Besides giving an interpretation of the immediate response postulate of
Assumption A5, this continuous time model selects among multiple equilibria
and yields the date at which integration occurs. In those cases in which the
reduced form game has a unique equilibrium, the continuous time model predicts
the same integration pattern, which then occurs at date 0.
3. Ex-post Monopolization: The Case of Perfect Certainty and No Investment
We now develop the first variant of our model in which the U compete a la
Bertrand in step 4. In this section, we consider the case in which the
upstream firms' marginal costs are certain and investment costs are zero; in
the next section, we extend the analysis to uncertain marginal costs and
positive investments. In sections 5 and 6, we consider the case where
upstream and downstream firms bargain over the terms of trade.
Under Bertrand competition, Step 4 is described as follows:
Step 4 (contract offers). Both U make simultaneous and secret contract
16offers to each unintegrated D. In a vertically integrated firm, given the
16The secrecy assumption reflects the possibility of hidden or side
contracting. It allows us to abstract from the possibility of contracts
commiting the downstream firms to adopt certain behaviors in the final
product market (see Fershtman-Judd [1987] and Katz [19873). In addition it
rules out the possibility that an upstream firm can commit itself to limit
its sales to some downstream firm by making an appropriate public offer to
that firm.
profit sharing assumption, this offer is a willingness to supply any level of
output at an internal marginal transfer price equal to the marginal cost c.
1
of the upstream unit.
We will not put any restriction on the contracts that can be signed
between a U and a D given the information structure.17 A simple contract
between Ui and Dj specifies a transfer tij from Dj to Ui that depends on the
quantity purchased by D. from Ui.: tij(qij) (for instance, a two-part tariff
is an affine function of qij). We will actually allow a finer information
structure and accordingly a larger class of feasible contracts. We suppose
that D. can show to U. any amount of the good (or exhibit receipts for the
sales on the final good market) as long as it does not exceed the total amount
of the good bought by D. from U. and U.. Thus, if Q. - qlj+q2j is the
quantity purchased by Dj, D. can demonstrate any Qij < Q. to Ui.  Accordingly
^ 18
we allow "conditional contracts" t.. (qj, Qij).
17Unlike most papers in the literature, we are not conferring an exogenous
advantage to the integrated firms by having the internal transfer price be
equal to marginal cost while external transfer prices differ from marginal
cost because two-part tariffs are ruled out. We will allow general contracts
(including two-part tariffs) for external transactions.
181 8The reason for introducing conditional contracts is technical. Conditional
contracts turn out to be irrelevant in six of the seven possible industry
structures, and the reader might as well think in terms of simple contracts.
In the seventh industry structure (partial integration in which the higher
cost upstream firm is integrated), no equilibrium exists that involves simple
contracts only (unless cl - c2 or Ic2 -cl is large); there exists an
equilibrium in conditional contracts offers in which the downstream firms end
up choosing simple contracts (so that conditional clauses, although offered,
are not selected on the equilibrium path). Furthermore, we argue that this
equilibrium yields the reasonable outcome of a richer contract offer game in
which only simple contracts are enforceable: See footnote 20.
Step 5 (acceptance/rejection of contracts). The unintegrated downstream
firm(s) simultaneously accept or reject the contracts offered in Step 4. If
D. accepts U.'s offer, it selects an input level qij and (in the case of a
A
conditional contract) announces a quantity Qij to be exhibited later to U.,
A
such that Qij Qj ql+q2j
1j .j j1j 2j
Assume, without loss of generality, that cl 1 c2. We describe
equilibrium in the four industry structures that are possible given that no
firm exits, and relegate the study of uniqueness to Appendix 2.
U Nonintegration.
The outcome under nonintegration is given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Assume cl 1 c2. Under nonintegration, D1 and D2 each buy q
- q (c) from U1 and 0 from U2, where q is the Cournot level
corresponding to marginal cost cI: q - R1 (q ). They each
pay a transfer t to U1 and 0 to U2, where
(3.1) r(q ,q )-t - r(R 2 (q ),q )-c 2R 2(q ).
Total output is 2q and profits are:
SU N I  ** * * * *
U: U N(C 2 ) - 2(r(q ,q )-clq )-2(r(R2( q ),q )-c2R2( q ))
U 2 : UNI(c 2 ,c1 ) - 0
NI * )* )
D.: D (c c 2 ) - r(R2(q ),q )-c2R2( q ) for j - 1,2.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. In equilibrium each D
anticipates that its rival buys the Cournot output from the low-cost firm.
Given this it can do no better than buying q from the low-cost firm too.
The transfer price given by (3.1) is such that each D is indifferent between
accepting U 's offer to sell q at t and buying the best reaction to q
given marginal cost c2, at a cost of c2 per unit (from U2). Ul's profit is
equal to industry profit minus the downstream firms' profit. Note that, from
Bertrand competition, UNI(c,c) - 0 for all c.
The proof of Proposition 1, as well as of other propositions in this
section, is to be found in Appendix 1.
a Partial integration PI1
.
Suppose now that U1 and D1 are integrated and
U2 and D2 have remained independent. We index profits by "PI". In
particular, we let D P(c,c') denote the nonintegrated downstream firm's profit
when the integrated supplier has cost c and the nonintegrated one has cost c'
Proposition 2. Assume cl 1 c2. Let (ql,q 2) 2 (ql(C 1lc 2),q2 (c1 ,c2 )) be given
by q1 - R1(q2) and q2 - R2(ql). Thus q1  
q (C1 ) 2 q2 and
q1+q2 5 2q (cl). Under PI1, U1 produces ql for the internal
buyer D1 and sells q2 at price t2 to D2 where
* *
(3.2) t2 - c2q2.
U2 does not sell. Total industry output is (ql+q 2) and profits
are:
(U-D1): vP (c1 ,c2)-E, where
V (c1 ,c2 ) - r(ql',q 2 )-Cq 1+(C 2 -C1)q 2
U NI(cl,c 2 )+DNI (cc2)
U 2 : UPI(c 2 ,c) - 0 UNI(c 2 c1)
PI* * * NI
D2 : D (c1 ,c2) - r(q2'ql)-c 2q2 2 D (c1 ,c2).
All inequalities in this proposition are strict if and only if
C1 < c2'
In words, the equilibrium is the Cournot equilibrium between two firms
with marginal costs cl and c2 except that production efficiency holds. The
low cost, integrated upstream firm supplies q2 to the external buyer at
profit (c2 -c1)q 2 . The comparison with the non-integrated case is depicted in
Figure 1.
Figure 1 Here
The difference from nonintegration stems from the fact that an
integrated U - D1, because of profit-sharing, has an incentive to restrict
supplies to D2 as much as possible. However, since it cannot stop U2 from
supplying R2(q1), its best strategy is to undercut U2 slightly and supply
R2(q1 ) itself. D2 is partially foreclosed and is hurt by vertical
integration, while the profit of the integrated firm rises. Ex-post
. . . dR1monopolization (q +q2 < 2q if c1 < c2) results from the facts that -1 < dqR12 f2 dq2
< 0 and (ql,q2) and (q ,q ) are both on the q1 - R1(q 2) reaction curve. Note
that social welfare is reduced, and that (gross of the integration cost E)
industry profit has increased.
q=R 1 (q,)
Sql+q 2=2q*
~ 2
q2=R2(q1)
q.0 q
Figure
q2
q*
1 °2
M Full integration. Suppose now that (U1-D1) and (U2 -D2) are integrated.
Proposition 3: Under full integration and cl 1 c2, the allocation is the same
as under PI1 except that the integrated firm (U2 -D2 ) also
incurs efficiency loss E. That is, U1 supplies ql to D1 and
q2 to D2 and U2 does not supply. The profits are thus:
(U1-D1) vFI(clc2)-E, where VFl (cl,c 2) - VPI (c1 ,c2)
(U2 D 2 )  VFI (c2 ,cI )-E, where VFI(c 2,c) - DP I (c,c 2).
Thus, vertical integration by the high-cost supplier has no other effect
than the efficiency loss. The reason is that U2 did not supply D1 , D2
anyway. In particular (U2 -D2 ) do not have an incentive to integrate in the
deterministic case if (U1 -D1 ) have integrated. We will see in contrast that
with uncertain costs, bandwagoning may occur.
S PI2: Last, suppose that only (U2-D2) are integrated and that cl 1 c2.
Proposition 4: Under PI2 and cl 1 c2 , the allocation is the same as under NI,
except that (U2-D2) incurs the efficiency loss E. U 1 supplies
q - q (cl) to both D1 and D2 and U2 does not supply.
Industry output is 2q and profits are:
U: UPI (c1 ,c2 ) - UNI(cIc 2 )
D1: D PI(c 2 ,c) - DNI(c 1 ,c2)
(U2 -D2): V Pl(c2 ,c1 )-E, where V (c2 ,c1 ) - DNI(c 1 ,c2 ).
As in Proposition 3, vertical integration by the high-cost supplier has
no other effect than the efficiency loss.
19
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We turn next to the ex-ante stage. This is trivial when cl, c2 are
deterministic and investment costs are zero. We have seen that U2 - D2 have
no incentive to integrate, whether or not U1 - D1 have. Thus the possible
equ....ilibri industry structures are nonintegration and partial integration by
U1 - Dl
. 
The latter will occur if and only if U1 - D1 's profit is higher
199Some readers have questioned how our analysis would change if D1, D2
competed A la Bertrand instead of A la Cournot in the downstream market.
Note that this would involve a radical change in the timing of production and
sales. Given our assumption that upstream firms must first ship the
intermediate good to downstream firms, and that downstream firms then
transform this good into final output, the downstream market game is played
by firms with capacity constraints, and as noted previously, the outcome will
inevitably be Cournot if cl, c2 are high enough.
It is worth giving the flavor of the argument as to why there may exist no
pure strategy equilibrium in simple contracts under PI2 (see footnote 18).
U2 can try to reduce industry output by offering q2 1 < q to D1 at the
money-losing price t2 1 < c2 21 such that D1 makes more profit accepting U2's
offer than U 's. While such a strategy would be too costly in terms of
production cost for U2 if c2 is much larger than cl, it may become optimal
for U2 if c2 is close to cl . We find such a strategy unlikely to succeed in
practice. Basically, U2 bribes D1 to purchase a low output. But D1 would
always go back to U1 to buy more output and brings itself to the reaction
curve R1
. 
If such recontracting is feasible, U2's counterstrategy does not
succeed in bringing industry output below 2q . The possibility of D 's
getting more from U1 is formalized in the equilibrium of our one-shot
contracting game by Ul's sleeping clause allowing D1 to complement to q its
purchases from U2.
under partial integration than nonintegration, i.e.
PI (cI , c2 ) - (UNI(clc 2 ) + DNI(c 1 ,c2 )) - E > 0.
This completes our analysis of the deterministic-marginal-cost, zero-
investment-cost case. In the next section we consider uncertain marginal cost
and positive investment cost. Since Section 4 is more involved, the reader
may well wish to skip to Section 5 on first reading.
4. Ex-post monopolization: Uncertainty and positive investments
We now look at the general ex-post monopolization variant with
uncertainty and investments. cl and c2 are uncertain ex-ante but are known
ex-post. In the certainty case with cl 5 c2, U2 had no incentive at all to
remain in the industry and so with I > 0, it would have exited. This feature
disappears once cl and c2 are stochastic. Because c2 < cl with some
probability, U2 has an incentive to stay to take advantage of realizations in
which it is the more efficient firm, as long as I is small. We start by
considering the case in which investments costs I and J are small enough that
none of the four parties has an incentive to exit.
4.1 The ex-ante stage when investment costs are small.
In order to analyze the case where cl and c2 are uncertain, we make use
of the following corollary of Propositions 1 through 4: (Ui-Di)'s gain from
integration is independent of whether U. and D. merge. (This is not to say
they are indifferent as to U. and D.'s integration decision; rather,
integration by U. and D. implies the same decrease in the aggregate profit of3 3
U. and D. whether U. and D. are integrated or not.)1 1 1 1
For ci _ c , define the ex-post gain from integration for Ui and D.:
g(ci c.) VP I (c.,c.)-(U NI(c.,c)+DN I (c.c.))1 3 1( 3 1i3 1( 3
- FI (ci c )-(UPI (cic )+DPI (cj ))
Note that g(c,c) - 0 for all c. For c. a c. the ex-post gain from integration
g(ci,cj) - 0. The ex-ante or expected gain from integration for (Ui-D i ) is
thus
G(Fi,F.) -
1 3
& g(c i ,c.)
(c i<cj )ic.c. 1j
The deterministic case suggests that the efficient firm gains more from
integration than the inefficient one (which does not gain anything). We now
show that the same holds in the uncertainty case. The natural definition of
efficiency refers to first-order stochastic dominance.
Definition: U1 is more efficient than U2 if Fl(c) a F2(c) for all c (with
at least some strict inequality).
Proposition 5: Suppose that U1 is more efficient than U2 and that either
(i) [c,c] is sufficiently small where [c,c] is the support
of F1 and F2 (small uncertainty),
or (ii) ci - c with probability a i and - +o with probability
(1-ai) where a1 > a2 (large uncertainty).
Then U1 has more incentive to integrate than U2
G(F1IF 2 ) > G(F2'F 1).
Eg(ci,c j)) -
The proof of Proposition 5 is in Appendix 4.
Next, we study the loss L(Fi,Fj) incurred by U. and D. when U. and D.
merge. Propositions 1 through 4 imply that this loss is independent of
whether U. and D. are integrated or not. Define for c. > c.
S NI P
-(c.,c.) D (c.,c.)-D (cj ,c.)
- V (c.,c.)-V (c .,c.);
and for c. < c., e(c ,c ) - 0.1 - 3' 13j Last define
L(Fi, Fj ) - @e(cic j ) - 0 tceci tc
c E
Proposition 6: Suppose that U1 is more efficient than U2 and that one of the
two assumptions of Proposition 5 (small uncertainty, large
uncertainty) holds. Then U1 and D1 lose less from U2 and D2
integrating than U2 and D2 lose when U1 and D1 integrate:
L(F1,F 2 ) 5 L(F2'F 1).
Proposition 6 is proved in Appendix 5. Under the assumptions of
Propositions 5-6, it is straightforward to solve the merger game. Let G. -
G(Fi., F.) and Li = L(Fi., F.), where by Propositions 5-6, G1 C G2 and L1 < L .
a Case 1: G1 < E (which implies G2 < E). In this case, U1 and U2 have a
dominant strategy not to integrate. The industry structure is nonintegration.
* Case 2: G -L1 > E. In this case, it is a dominant strategy for U1 to
integrate. There are two subcases:
- If G 2 < E, the outcome is PI1.
- If G2 > E, the outcome is FI. We can further distinguish between eager
bandwagon, which arises when U2-D2 prefer a fully integrated industry to a
nonintegrated industry (G2-L 2 > E), and reluctant bandwagon, which arises
when U2-D 2 follow suit, but would have preferred the industry to remain
nonintegrated (G2 -L2 < E).
N Case 3: G1-L1 < E < GC
. 
In this case, U1 wants to integrate only if U2
does not jump on the bandwagon. Thus
If G2 < E, U1 integrates and the industry structure is PI1I
If G2 > E, U1 refrain from integrating because this would trigger full
integration. The industry structure is NI.
The stochastic cost case is summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Suppose that U1 is more efficient than U2 and that small
uncertainty or large uncertainty holds.
Then:
(1) If G1 < E, or G1 - L1 < E < G1 and G2 > E, the industry structure is
nonintegration.
(2) If G1 - L1 > E and G2 < E, or G L1 < E < G1 and G2 < E, the industry
structure is partial integration by U1 - D1.
(3) If G1 - L1 > E, G2 > E, the industry structure is full integration.
A welfare comparison of the different industry structures is simple in
the case where I, J are sufficiently small that none of the four parties ever
exits.
0 Welfare: The notion of welfare is the sum of consumer and producer
surplus.
Proposition 8: In the absence of exit, any industry structure involving
vertical integration (PI1, PI2 , FI) is socially dominated by
the nonintegrated industry structure (NI).
Proof: Vertical integration implies two welfare losses: the efficiency loss
(E under PI1 and PI2 , and 2E under FI) and output contraction
(q1 (c1,c2)+q2 (c1 ,c2) < q (ci ) if ci < cj and either regime P.I or FI holds --
see Propositions 2 through 4).
Q.E.D.
We now consider general investment costs I and J. Because we must now
allow for the possibility of exit, we start by solving the ex-post stage when
exit has occured (Subsection 4.2). We then solve the merger game (Subsections
4.3 and 4.4 and Appendix 7).
4.2 The ex-post stage after ex-ante monopolization. Assume without loss of
generality that U1 and D1 have integrated. We consider the case where
integration by U1 - D1 causes D2 or U2 or both to exit, leading to ex-ante
monopolization. We will denote the three cases by Mud (both U2 and D2
have exited), Md (only D2 has exited) and Mu (only U2 has exited).
0 Upstream and downstream monopolization (Mud) or upstream
monopolization (Md).
If U1 and D1 , who have integrated, are monopolists in their respective
industry segments, and U1 has marginal cost cl, then (U1-D1 )'s profit is
Mud wher vMud , m )
V ud(c )-E, where V (c1) - m(c ). The same holds if U2 only has exited as
M M
U1 supplies only its internal unit D1; hence V u(c) - V Mud(C
0 Downstream monopolization (Md). Suppose that only D2 has exited.
If c1 : c2 , then DI procures internally and (U1 -D1 )'s profit is
M M Md
Md(c 2)-E, where V dcc2 - m(cl) while U2 's profit, U (c2 ,c1 ), is
equal to zero.
If c1 > c2 , then U2 makes an offer to supply qm(c 2) to D1 at price t2 1
(qm(c2 ))qm(c2 )-m(cl). Hence the profits are: for (U1-D1 ): V d(cl,c 2)-E,
M M
where V (cl,c 2 ) - rn(cl); and for U2 : U (c2 ,c1 ) - 7m(c2)- m(cl).
4.3. I "small" J "large" (possibility of ex-ante downstream
monopolization).
Next we assume that downstream firms' investment is large in the sense
that J > ED P(cl,c2 ), where @ is the expectation with respect to cl, c2;
while the upstream firms' investment remains small. Throughout Section 4,
we assume that none of the firms exits in step 2 under nonintegration:
NI
A6 (viability under nonintegration): For all i and j, CU (c.,c.) & I and
CD (ci,c.) a J.
We first analyze when a U wants to rescue a failing D by merging with
it; this may happen sometimes even though U and D would not want to merge if D
were viable (we will call this forced bandwagon). We relegate the
investigation of the merger game to Appendix 7.
a When does a U want to rescue a failing D? We saw that when U. and D.
1 1
integrate, only D. suffers directly. Its loss is equal to L.. This may lead
D. to exit if its new expected profit falls under J and U. does not come to
its rescue by accepting a merger with D.. A merger gives D. an incentive to
invest since, given profit sharing, investment costs can be split between D.
and U.. [U. cannot come to D.'s rescue by subsidizing its investment cost
because investment is not contractible. The only thing it can do is to merge
at a reasonable price.]
As we will see, a crucial factor for knowing whether U. and D. merge when
U. and D. have merged is whether U. is made better off by D.'s exit. Let us1 1 JM M 3
d d
simplify the notation a bit: Let 'U. CGU (cj,c i ) denote U.'s expected
profit when D. exits; 21PI - &GU (c.,c.) be U.'s expected profit under partial
FI FIintegration and no ex-ance monopolization; Vj  - CV (c ,c.) be (U.-D.)'s
PI PI
expected profit under full integration; Pj -.D (c.i,cj) be D.j's expected
profit under partial integration if it stays. (Note that these expected
profits are computed assuming that (Ui-Di) are integrated.)
1 1
Md
Proposition 9: Following i and Di.'s merger, Uj would prefer D. to exit ('.
> VU. ) in the case of large uncertainty. U would prefer D.
M PI
to stay (U' < 'U ) in the case of small uncertainty.
Proposition 9 (proved in Appendix 6) indicates when U. would like to
keep an industrial base downstream. The intuition is that when U. has a large
cost advantage over U. (which may arise in the large uncertainty case), U. is
able to obtain the monopoly profit if it deals with a single downstream firm
(in the absence of the bargaining effect emphasized in Sections 5 and 6),
while it cannot commit not to supply both downstream firms if Dj stays around.
We call this the commitment effect. In contrast, Bertrand competition between
the upstream firms implies that if U. has only a small cost advantage over Ui ,
Uj.'s profit is approximately 2q (c.)(ci-c.) when both downstream firms are
around, where q (cj) is the symmetric Cournot output for cost c.; and
m m
q (c )(c.-cj ) when only D. is around, where q (cj) is the monopoly output at
cost c.. Because the Cournot industry output exceeds the monopoly output, U.
is better off facing two downstream units. We call this the demand effect.
M Forced bandwagon: Next suppose that U. and D. have merged. We say that
forced bandwagon by U. and D. occurs if the following three conditions hold:
PI(a) J > 2PI (D. is no longer viable by itself).
3 3
MFI d(b) V. -E-J > U. (U and D. are better off integrating than letting D.
exit).
PI PI FI(c) U +D -J > V. -E-J (U. and D. would not want to merge if D. were
viable).
We now investigate the conditions under which forced bandwagon can follow
U.-D.'s merger.
1 1
Proposition 10: Suppose U. and D. have merged.
1 1
(i) A necessary condition for forced bandwagon is that U.
PI MMd
would prefer D. not to exit: . > 1. .
PI d(ii) Conversely, if PI. > 21. , there exists (E,J) suchj J
that forced bandwagon occurs.
Proof: (i) Add (a), (b), and (c).
(ii) Straightforward. Q.E.D.
Propositions 9 and 10 together say that forced bandwagon cannot occur
for large uncertainty, but may occur for small uncertainty because the non-
integrated upstream supplier is concerned about keeping an industrial base.
M The merger game. The merger game with large downstream investments
involves many cases, including pre-emption and war of attrition games. See
Appendix 7.
4.4 1 "large", J "large" (possibility of ex-ante upstream and downstream
monopolization).
We do not treat the case of general investments upstream and downstream.
We content ourselves with the following observation: When U. and D. merge, U.
may suffer indirectly through the exit of D. (see Proposition 9), and may exit3
itself. Given that Dj exits, the exit of U. can only hurt the integrated firm
(Ui-Di) as (Ui-D i) can always refuse to trade with U.. It is therefore
conceivable that Ui and Di might refrain from integrating because this would
trigger a chain of exits and reduce the industrial base upstream. In the
model of this section, however, this phenomenon does not arise because we
assumed that the upstream firms set prices. Hence, when U. is more efficient
than U. it makes an offer to (Ui-D i) that makes (Ui-D i) indifferent between
accepting the offer and using the internal technology. Thus (Ui-Di) does not
benefit from U.'s not exiting. But if the bargaining power were more evenly
distributed, the phenomenon could occur; we return to these ideas in Section
6.
5. Bargaining Effects (Scarce Needs).
In the previous sections, we focussed on the idea that an upstream firm
and a downstream firm might integrate in order to reduce their willingness to
supply a rival downstream firm, thus enabling them to monopolize (at least
partially) the downstream market. In this and the next section we analyze a
different mechanism by which foreclosure can occur: via bargaining effects.
In particular, we argue that an upstream firm and a downstream firm may merge
in order to ensure that they trade with each other, i.e. that the upstream
firm channels scarce supplies to its downstream partner rather than to a
downstream competitor and that the downstream firm satisfies its scarce needs
by purchasing from its upstream partner rather than an upstream competitor.
This can benefit the merging firms in two ways. First, to the extent that
rival firms were obtaining some profit from trading with the merging partners
previously, the merger, by eliminating this profit, will increase the merging
firms' share of total profit. Second, the profits of rival firms may fall
below the critical level at which they are covering their costs and hence
they may exit the market. As a result the merging firms may succeed in
monopolizing the market ex-ante.
We will present two models that capture these ideas. The first, in this
section, focusses on a downstream firm with scarce needs favoring its upstream
partner. The second, in Section 6, focusses on an upstream firm with scarce
supplies favoring its downstream partner. We separate these effects both
because they have somewhat different implications and also to avoid making the
analysis too burdensome. Obviously in many real situations one would expect
to find both effects.
The Case of Scarce Needs.
The framework is similar to that of Section 3. As there, we suppose
two upstream firms and two downstream firms. In the present
variant,downstream firms are not directly hurt by vertical integration and we
can assume without loss of generality that their investment is equal to zero.
Denote the investment cost of upstream firm U. by I. (i-1,2), where, without
loss of generality, Il 12. In order to abstract from the ex-post
monopolization issues discussed in the last section, we suppose that U1 and
U2 have the same constant marginal cost c. (In this case, the model of
Section 3 predicted that nonintegration would be the outcome.) However, we
now drop the assumption that the upstream firms make independent and
simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the downstream firms, supposing
instead that contracts are bargained over. To be more specific, we assume
that each (nonintegrated) upstream firm negotiates with each downstream firm
to be its supplier. Moreover, the bargaining of an independent Ui with D1 is
21
independent of the bargaining of U. with D2' Finally, the competition of
the upstream firms is not so fierce that their profits are completely
eliminated; instead we suppose that a constant fraction f of the surplus from
1
supplying a downstream firm accrues to each upstream firm, where 0 < A < 2
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(so the fraction of surplus accruing to the downstream firm is (1-2f)). We
will also sometimes need to consider the case where there is only one
upstream firm in the market. In this case we assume that this upstream firm
captures a fraction f' of the surplus from supplying a downstream firm, where
f' > 2f (so a downstream firm does strictly worse bargaining with one
upstream firm than with two).
Remark. The Scarce Needs variant can be reinterpreted as applying to a
situation where the upstream firms supply a piece of machinery or a technology
that allows the downstream firms to produce at marginal cost c. Each
downstream firm has a unit demand for the machinery or the technology. In
this reinterpretation, the sense in which needs are scarce is particularly
clear.
21If U. and D. are integrated, bargaining between them over price is irrelevant
1 1
given our assumption that managers of U. and D. both get a fraction of total
profit. As we shall see, in this case, U. - D. will still want to compete
with U. to supply D. (assuming U. has not exited).
2 2Here 4 should be understood as the expected share of the surplus that U
obtains rather than the actual share. For example, one interpretation is that
each upstream firm wins the competition to supply a particular downstream firm
with probability 1/2, the winner receives a share 2P of profit and the loser
receives nothing.
Nonintegration.
Suppose for the moment that both upstream firms invest under
nonintegration. Since U1,U 2 have the same marginal cost, the reaction curves
R1,R 2 defined in the last section are the same: R1 (q) - R2 (q) - R(q), say.
The equilibrium under nonintegration is described in the next proposition.
Proposition 11: Under nonintegration, D1 and D2 each buy q* from the
upstream firms, where q* is the Cournot level corresponding
to marginal cost c: q* - R(q*). The surplus to be shared
between each downstream firm Di and U1 and U2 , given that the
rival downstream firm chooses q*, is P(2q*)q* - cq* = d, and
this is divided in the proportions (1-2p), P and P
respectively. Total output is 2q* and profits are:
NI d d dU: UNI - f d + d - 2f d
NI d
D. D - (1 - 24) .
The proof of this proposition is very straightforward. Let ql,q 2 be the
amounts that D1 and D2 are expected to purchase in equilibrium. Then D1 in
combination with either (or both) of U1 or U2 can, taking q2 as given, achieve
a total surplus of Max P(q + q2 )q - cq]. The solution to this maximization
q
problem is q1 - R(q2 ). By a similar argument, q2 - R(ql). It follows that
q - q 2 - q*. The remainder of Proposition 11 follows from 
our assumptions
about bargaining and the division of surplus.
Full Integration.
Consider next full integration, maintaining for the moment the
assumption that U1 and U2 both invest. Then the only change caused by full
integration is that D1 will obtain all its supplies from its partner Ul, and
similarly D2 will obtain all its supplies from U2 (there is no reason to buy
externally given that internal production is as cheap). This does not change
equilibrium output levels since the best reaction for U. - D. to an expected
1 1
purchase of qj by Dj is R(q ). Hence ql - R(q2) and q2 - Rl(ql), i.e. q
q2 - q* . U1 and D1 will together share the profit wd , and similarly so will
U2 and D2 . From these profits must be subtracted the integration costs E.
The outcome is summarized in Proposition 12.
Proposition 12. Under full integration, D. buys q* from upstream firm U
(i-1,2), where q* - R(q*). Total output is 2q* and profits
are:
(U1  D1)  FI d E
FI d(U D2): V - - E.
Note that the combined profits of U. - D. are the same under
1 1
full integration as under nonintegration, except for the integration cost.
Partial Integration.
Suppose next that U. and D. integrate, U. and D. remain separate, and
U.,U. both continue to invest. U. will now supply all of D.'s needs, putting
D. on its reaction curve R(q ); but, as in the case of nonintegration, Ui and1 J 1
U. will compete for D.'s custom. The latter conclusion follows from the fact
that, given that U. and Uj have the same marginal costs, Ui cannot gain
ex-post from refusing to deal with D. or restricting its supplies to D.: U.
alone will agree to put D. on its reaction curve R(q ), which is the same
outcome that occurs if U. and U. are both willing to supply D..
This argument shows that qi - R(q ), qj - R(qi), i.e. qi - q - q*.
Although partial integration does not change output levels, however, it does
affect the division of surplus. U. will lose the P d it earned from
supplying D. under nonintegration (i.e. U. - D. will now divide nd between
1 1 1
them); while the gains from trade that D. can realize in combination with U.
and/or U. will be shared in the proportions 1-28,,8,, respectively.
Proposition 13: Under partial integration, D. buys q* from U. and D. buys q*
from U i and/or Uj, where q* - R(q*). Total output is 2q* and
profits are:
.l d
U.-D.: V P I  (1+) d - E.
1 1
PI dU. U - ir
PI d
D.: DP I - (1-28) n•
U. - D.'s combined profits are higher by nd - E under partial
1 1
integration than under nonintegration. On the other hand, U. - D.'s profits
d
are lower by f n
Ex-ante Monopolization.
So far we have supposed that Ul, U2 both invest under both integration
and nonintegration. The final structure we consider is where U1 and D1
integrate and this causes U2 not to invest (to exit). (The mirror image
case in which the higher-investment cost firm U2 merges with D2 and U1 exits
will turn out to be irrelevant.) This case leaves the single supplier U1
facing two upstream firms D1, D2 , one of which is its partner. We can apply
Proposition 1 of the previous section to learn the outcome: U1 will supply
only D1 and will monopolize the market, i.e. U - D1 will choose the output
level qm that maximizes P(q)q - cq.
mm m m
Denote monopoly profit, P(q )q - cq by r .
Proposition 14: Under ex-ante monopolization (integration by U1 - D1 and exit
by U2), D1 buys qm from U1 where qm maximizes P(q)q - cq, and
D2 buys nothing. Total output is qm and profits are:
M
u mU - D : V - n - E,
U2: zero,
D2: zero.
We will assume in what follows that U1 - D1 's profits are higher if they
can monopolize the market ex-ante than under nonintegration. That is:
(5.1) u m d(5.1) V - 7 - E > 7 .
If this were not the case, integration would not be profitable under any
conditions in the model of this section.23
The Investment Decision.
Let's reconsider our assumption that upstream firms invest. Under
nonintegration, U1 and U2 cover their costs and invest as long as
(5.2) 2 d > 12'
We assume (5.2) in what follows.
Consider next full integration. Here investment is less of an issue for
the following reason. Full integration plus exit by Ui, say, could never be a
correctly anticipated equilibrium outcome, since, given that D. will not be
supplied by U. and will make zero profits, U. - D. could do better by staying
separate and saving their merger costs E.
Consider finally partial integration -- in particular the case where U1
and D1 merge but U2 and D2 stay separate (the logic in the reverse case is
similar). Under these conditions, as we have already noted, U2 may or may
not invest. It is easily seen, however, that U1 invests. In particular,
suppose the contrary: U1 does not invest, but U2 does. (If U2 does not
invest, U1 - D1's profits are automatically zero if U1 does not invest and
hence in this case it is better for U1 to invest.) Then ex-post a single
nonintegrated firm U2 will face two downstream firms D1, D2 . Applying the
same logic as in Proposition 1, we see that U2 will supply q* to each of D1,
23 Mu d d m dIn particular, V ir < E, since w > 27 . That is, the net gain to
U. - D. from integrating when U. - D. stay separate is negative.
D2 . Moreover, given our assumption about one-on-one bargaining, D1 and D2
d
will obtain a share (1-f8') of the surplus w , and U2 will obtain the
remainder. Thus U 1 - D I 's profits will be (l-8') dr - E. But 1 1 12, .' >
and (5.2) imply that
(1-8"') d < (1+) d I
'
which ensures that U1 - D1 can do better by investing (see Proposition 13).
Thus it is never profitable for U - D1 to merge and U1 not to invest.
The Merger Game.
We treat the merger game as in the ex-post monopolization variant. In
particular, we suppose that the merger is irreversible and that if Ui and D
merge, U. and D. can respond instantaneously by merging too. Under these
assumptions it is easy to see that in the present model full integration will
never be an equilibrium outcome. This is because neither U1 - D nor U2 - D2
will merge if the other follows suit since by Propositions 11-12, the final
profit of each U. - D. pair will be less than the combined profits of U. and
1 1 1
D. under nonintegration.1
Partial integration without exit is also not a possible outcome. The
reason is that, as in the ex-post monopolization variant the gain from U. - D.
d
merging is the same whether Ui , D. are integrated or not; and is given by P3 n
- E. If this gain is positive, then U. - D. will follow suit if U. D.j j 1 1
merge. On the other hand, if it is negative, then U. - D. will not follow
suit, but U. - D. will also prefer nonintegration to partial integration.1 1
Hence the only reason for U. and D. to merge is if the response of U. is
to exit. In other words, the final outcome of the merger game will be either
nonintegration or ex-ante monopolization.
Proposition 15 tells us which of these outcomes will actually occur. In
the formal statement of the proposition we suppose that U1 - D1 merge if any
merger occurs at all. It turns out that in subcase 2 of the proposition,
there can be another equilibrium in which U2 - D2 merge and U1 exits. We
will argue, however, that this equilibrium is not compelling because in the
continuous time model described in Section 2, U1 - D1 would pre-empt U2 - D2
by merging prior to date 0.
Proposition 15: Assume (5.1)-(5.2). Suppose also that U - D1 decide
first whether to merge, and if and only if they merge, U2 - D2 can
respond by merging too. Then:
(1) The merger game will result in nonintegration if either
(a) W d > E and d - E > 1; or
(b) r d < E, and rd - E > 12*
(c) ir < E, f d > 12
.
(2) The merger game will result in a merger of U1 - D1 and exit of U2 if
either
(a) Xd > E, nd - E < 12; or
d d d
(b) B id < E, d - E < 2 and r < 12 .
Note that as long as we rule out "probability zero" cases of equality
( rd - E, etc.), these cases are exhaustive.
The proof of Proposition 15 is straightforward. In Case l(a), f di > E
implies that U2 - D2 will find it profitable to bandwagon if U1 - D1 merge,
unless U2 exits. Since full integration is unprofitable for U1 - D1, this
d
means that U1 - D 1 merge only if U2 exits (i.e. only if id - E < 12). In
l(b), U2 - D2's profits are positive under full integration (rd - E > 12),
and hence U1 - D1 cannot force exit by U2. Therefore U1 - D1 prefer not to
integrate. In 1(c), U1 - D1 can again not force exit by U2 since, if U1 - D1
merge, U2 can cover its investment costs by staying independent. Again U1
D1 choose not to integrate.
Case 2 consists of the complementary region in parameter space to Case
1, i.e. it consists of those subcases where a merger by U1 - D1 will cause U2
to exit. Under these conditions, integration is profitable for U1 - D1 (by
(5.1)).
In Case 2 the model may be consistent with another outcome: U2 - D2
merge and U1 exits. In the continuous time version of the model described in
Section 2, however, this would lead to a preemption game that U1 - D1 would
win by merging at date (-T) where T satisfies:
-rT 2 I1
-E + e -0.
r
(Note that the discounted profit of U1 - D1 at date 0 in this equilibrium is
S(I2 - l1)/r>.) For this reason we have ignored the possibility that U2 - D2
merge and force exit of U1 in the above.
Remark. We have noted that in this "scarce needs" model, partial integration
(without exit) and bandwagon (full integration) are not possible outcomes.
However, there is another version of the "scarce needs" model where these
outcomes can occur. In particular, suppose that there are limits on how much
D1 and D2 can purchase from the upstream firms, e.g. because they have limited
storage. Then if D1 has larger storage than D2 , U1 may merge with D1 in order
to cut U2 out of the gains from trading with D . Moreover, this can be
profitable even if U2 - D2 respond by merging, in order to cut U1 out of the
gains from trading with D2.
Rather than analyze a model of this type, we turn in Section 6 to a
symmetric version of it in which the upstream firms have scarce capacities.
This model goes under the heading of Scarce Supplies.
Welfare.
The welfare effects of merger are straightforward in this variant.
Merger followed by exit leads to lower output (q vs. 2q*) and higher prices
for consumers. So consumer surplus falls. Producer surplus, however, rises
and in some cases total surplus may also rise as a result of the saving in
the exiting firm's investment cost.24
24 1i m a - c q a - cFor example, let p - a-bQ, Then q 2b ' 3ba - c Total
2
surplus if U 1 - D1 merge and U 2 exits, Wm 3 (a-c)b - - E. Total surplus
4 (a-c)2  d
under duopoly, d 9 b - 2 . If E is small and • E < 12 , it is
easy to check that (1) UI-D will merge and U2 will exit; (2) W > Wd .  Also
these conditions are consistent with 26i d > 1I2 i.e. with both firms investing
under nonintegration.
6. Bargaining Effects (Scarce Supplies).
We turn now to the case where the upstream firms are
capacity-constrained and integration occurs to ensure that an upstream firm
channels its scarce supplies to its downstream partner. To capture this
idea, we suppose that the two upstream firms Ul, U2 have exogenously given
capacities ql, q2, respectively. We assume that U1 is bigger than U2: q1 >
q2. To simplify, we suppose that U 's marginal cost of production is zero up
to its capacity constraint qi (i - 1,2) and that
(6.1) Q - + 2 qm - argmax P(q)q.
(6.1) ensures that there is no motive to monopolize the market ex-post
by restricting output. To be more precise, even if there were only one
downstream firm, given (6.1), it would wish to purchase, and sell on the
downstream market, all the output that U1 and U2 have available.
(6.1) is a simplifying assumption, which will fail to be satisfied in
25
many markets. In the absence of (6.1), aspects of the models of both
previous variants come into play (q - ®, qj - 0 arises in the large
uncertainty case of the ex-post monopolization model and qi - qj in the
Scarce Needs model). Also a new possibility must be dealt with: a downstream
firm may try to purchase more supplies than it needs and destroy some of them,
in order to keep them out of the hands of a rival (in principle, each firm
would like to destroy Q - q if it can buy all the supplies). If (6.1) holds,
such a strategy is never optimal. We should also stress that we are confident
that our results will continue to be relevant when (6.1) does not hold.
2 5We expect (6.1) to hold if the cost of building capacity is large.
Note that, while D1 and D2 compete for supplies, they do not really
compete on the product market. As long as no upstream firm exits, each unit
of the intermediate good has a fixed value, P(Q), for the downstream firms.
Thus, if upstream investment costs are small enough and ex-ante monopolization
is not an issue, the scarce supplies model applies to industries in which the
downstream firms are in separate product markets.
Because in this model, only the nonintegrated downstream firms are hurt
by integration, it is natural to assume that only Di has to invest in order to
operate (but see Remark 1 after Proposition 20, where we discuss upstream
investments). We denote Di's investment cost by J (assumed to be independent
of i).
We model bargaining in a similar way to Section 5, with the roles of the
upstream and downstream firms reversed. We assume that the downstream firms
negotiate with each independent upstream firm to purchase its supplies, where
the bargaining of Di with U1 is independent of the bargaining of Di with U2.
By analogy to Section 5, we suppose that a fraction 0 of the surplus from U.
supplying D1 or D2 accrues to each of D1, D2 and the remaining fraction
(1-2A) accrues to U.. We will also sometimes want to consider the case where1
a single downstream firm bargains with U . Under these conditions, again by
analogy to Section 5, the downstream firm receives a fraction 8' of the
surplus and U. receives 1 - 8', where 0' > 28.1
Nonintegration.
Suppose for the moment that both downstream firms invest under
nonintegration. The following proposition which characterizes equilibrium in
this case is immediate.
Proposition 16: Under nonintegration, the downstream firms buy the total
available capacity Q from the upstream firms. The surplus to
be shared between each upstream firm U. and D1 and D2 is
P(Q)qi and this is divided in the proportions (1-2~8), f and
respectively. Profits are:
U.: U - (1-2f) P(Q)qi
2 1 1
D.: DNI - P(Q)(q + q2 ) - f P(Q)Q
We turn next to full integration and partial integration, maintaining
for the moment the assumption that D1, D2 invest. If U. - D. and U. - D.1' 2 2 3 3
both merge, U. will sell all its supplies to D. and U. all its supplies to
D.. On the other hand, if U. - D. merge and U. and D. do not, U. will sell
all its supplies to Di., and D. and D. will compete for U.'s supplies.
The outcomes in these cases are summarized in Propositions 17-18.
Proposition 17: Under full integration, D. buys q. from U. (i - 1,2) and
profits are:
FI
(Ui D.): • - P(Q)qi - E. (i - 1,2).
2. 1 2. 2.
Proposition 18: Under partial integration (U - D merge, U - D. do not), D.
buys q. from U i , Di and D. compete to buy Uj's supplies qj,
sharing the surplus from this transaction in the proportions
f, P and (1-2p) respectively. Profits are:
(U - D )" V I - P(Q)(q + q ) - E,
PI
U.: U I - (1-2A) P(Q)qj,
PI
D.: D - P(Q)q..
Propositions 16 through 18 tell us that the gain to U1 - D1 from
integrating while its rival U2 - D2 does not is fP(Q)ql - E (this is the share
of surplus that D2 used to get from buying Ul's supplies, but which is now
divided between U1 and D1); and that the gain to U2 - D2 of jumping on the
bandwagon is BP(Q)q2 - E. In other words, as in the previous two variants,
the benefits to U. - D. of integrating are independent of whether U. - D.
integrate (this ignores the possibility that integration by U. - D. causes D.
to exit). In contrast to Section 5, however, U1 - D1 may gain from
integrating even if U - D follow suit since VI - (UN I + D N I ) - fP(Q)(q
2 2 i i .i
qj) - E, which may be positive if ql is sufficiently larger than q2 (however,
the same formula shows that U2 - D2 cannot gain from integrating if UI - DI
follow suit, given q2 < ql ) "
Propositions 16 through 18 also tell us that a merger by U1 - D1 reduces
PI
D2 's profits, but does not have a direct effect on U2's profits (compare U2
NI
and U2 ). The reduction in D2's profit may cause D2 to exit, a case we
consider next.
Ex-ante Monopolization (exit by D2).
With D2 exiting, D1 receives Ul's supplies automatically (since they are
merged) and negotiates to buy U2's supplies too. An important difference
between this case and previous ones is that if D1 declines to buy U2 's
supplies, they disappear from the market. Hence the gains that D1 can achieve
from trading with U2 are P(Q)Q - P(ql)q1 , rather than P(Q)(Q - ql) - P(Q)q 2
Given one-on-one bargaining, a proportion A' of these gains go to D1 and a
proportion (1-A') to U2.
Proposition 19: Under integration by U1 - D1 and exit by D2, D1 buys ql from
U1 and q2 from U2 . Profits are:
M d
(U1 - D1): V1 - P(q1)ql + P() - P(q 1)ql - E,
U2: U2 - (l ( - P(ql )1 ,
D2: Zero.
As in Section 5, we suppose that (U1 - D1)'s profits are higher under
ex-ante monopolization than under nonintegration. That is:
(6.2) 1 - P(q)q + PQ)Q - P(q)q - E > (1-2B)P(Q)ql + PP(Q)Q.
Note that the RHS is decreasing in A (since Q < 2ql) and so reaches a maximum
P(Q)ql when B - 0. Hence (6.2) certainly holds if E is small enough. Note
also that if (6.2) fails to hold, neither U1 - D1 nor U2 - D2 will ever have
an incentive to integrate in the present model, i.e. nonintegration will be
the outcome.
The Investment Decision.
Let's reconsider our assumption that downstream firms invest. Under
nonintegration, D1 and D2 cover their costs and invest as long as
(6.3) fP(Q)Q > J.
We assume (6.3) in what follows.
Under full integration, it is not difficult to show that it will never
pay D. to exit for some i. (Obviously it would not pay D1 and D2 both to
exit since then there would be no market.) In particular, U. - D. would do
better not to merge at all if merger leads to D 's exit. To see this, note
that the result of D.'s exit would be that U. would sell qi to D., receiving
a fraction (1 - f') of the surplus. (Ui - D.)'s total profits would be
(1-B') (P(Q)Q - P(q )qj) - E, as opposed to P(Q)qi - E - J if Di invests.
Because P(qj) _ P(Q), Di's exit increases (U. - Di)'s profit only if J >
f'P(Q)q.. But in the latter case, D. would exit if U. - D. were not
integrated, given that U. - D. are integrated; and thus Ui would enjoy profit
(l-8')(P(Q)Q - P(qj)qj) > (1-0')(P(Q)Q - P(q )qj) - E by not merging with
D.. Thus U. would be better off refusing to merge with D..
1 1 1
Consider finally partial integration -- in particular the case where U1
and D1 merge but U2 and D2 stay separate (the logic in the reverse case is
the same). Under these conditions, as we have already noted, D2 may or may
not invest. It is easily seen, however, that D1 invests (if UI - D1's merger
is worthwhile at all). In particular, note that, by the same argument as in
the full integration case, if D1 exits, U1 - DI 's profit equals (1-B')(p(Q)Q
- p(q2)q2) - E. But this is smaller than Ul's profit in the worst possible
scenario if U1 - D1 do not integrate, (l-1')(p(Q)Q - p(q2)q2) (which occurs
if U2 - D2 integrate and D1 exits).
The Merger Game.
As above, we suppose that a merger is irreversible and that if Ui and Di
merge, U. and D. can respond instantaneously by merging too.
As in Proposition 15, we begin by supposing that U1 - D1 merge if any
merger occurs at all, and investigate U2 - D2's incentive to respond. We then
check that U 2 - D 2 would not preempt U 1 - D1 and prevent U1 - D1 from
integrating. It is clear that the worst outcome for U1 - D1 is if U2 - D2
decide to merge too. The reason is that in this case U2's supplies are
denied to D1 but at the same time they are sold on the market and so depress
output price. Hence if U1 - D1's profits rise from merger even in this case,
we know that U1 - D1 will certainly merge: doing so is a dominant strategy.
From Propositions 16-17, we conclude that if
(6.4) fP(Q)(ql - q2 ) > E,
U1 - D1 certainly merge.
On the other hand, if
(6.5) 6P(Q)(ql -q 2 ) < E,
U1 - D 's decision to merge will depend on U 2 - D2's response. Proposition
20, which is proved in Appendix 8, provides a full characterization of the
different cases. Let A - P(Q)q2-J-E, B - (1-p')[P(Q)Q 
- P(q 1 )q
Proposition 20: Suppose U1 - D1 decide first whether to merge, and if and
only if they merge, U2 - D2 can respond by merging too.
Then:
(A) If AP(Q)(ql - q2 ) > E and PP(Q)q2 > E, U1 - D1 will merge and
(1) U2 - D2 will also merge if A > B (reluctant bandwagon: U2 - D2 prefer to
merge than stay independent, given that U1 - D1 merge, but U2 - D2 is
worse off than under nonintegration)
(2) D2 will exit if A < B.
(B) If 8P(Q)(ql - q2 ) > E and BP(Q)q 2 < E, U 1 - D1 will merge and
(1) U2, D2 will stay independent with D2 investing if PP(Q)q2 > J.
(2) D2 will exit if fP(Q)q2 < J and A < B
(3) U 2 - D 2 will merge if ýP(Q)q2 < J and A > B (forced bandwagon: U 2 - D 2
would prefer to stay independent but cannot since D2 would exit)
(C) If BP(Q)(ql - q2 ) < E,
(1) U1 - D1 will merge and D2 will exit if 8P(Q)q2 < J and A < B.
(2) U1 - D1 will merge, U2 and D2 will stay separate and D2 will not exit if
PP(Q)q2 > J, fP(Q)q2 < E and eP(Q)ql > E.
(3) No merger will occur if PP(Q)q2 < J and A > B
or PP(Q)q2 > J, fP(Q)q 2 > E
or PP(Q)q 2 > J, fP(Q)q 2 < E and eP(Q)ql < E.
Note that a merger by U1 - D1 will certainly occur if ql is very large
relative to q2' i.e. ql = Q, q2 = O. This is because (6.2) implies that
mP(Q)Q P P(Q)(ql - q2 ) > E. However, a merger by U1 - D1 can also occur
even if q1 and q2 are quite close, if the shift in surplus away from D2 is
just enough to cause D2's profits to fall below J and lead to D2's exit
(e.g., consider Proposition 20C(l) and suppose PP(Q)q 2 " J ' P(Q) - P(ql) and
"' very small).
It is worth noting that eager bandwagon is never an outcome in this
model. U2 - D2 are never better off under full integration than
nonintegration; this follows from the fact that (6.4) cannot hold where q1 and
q2 are interchanged. However, reluctant bandwagon occurs in A(1) and forced
bandwagon in B(3).
So far we have assumed that U1 - D1 move first. Might U2 - D2 want to
pre-empt a merger by U1 - D1? Clearly there is no advantage to pre-emption
if U1 - D1 decide to merge anyway (U2 - D 2 would do better to let U1 - D1
merge first and then select a best response). This means that pre-emption is
useless in Cases A and B of Proposition 20 since merger by U1 - D1 is a
dominant strategy. In Case C(3), pre-emption is unnecessary since no merger
occurs anyway. This leaves C(1) and C(2). C(2) implies that ýP(Q)ql > J,
i.e, D1 doesn't exit if U2 - D2 merge; moreover, together with fP(Q)ql > E
(see C(2)), this tells us that U1 - D1 will jump on the bandwagon. Hence
pre-emption does not prevent merger here. This leaves C(1). It is easy to
check that in the continuous time preemption game described in Section 2, U1
- D1 has more incentive to integrate, and preempts U2 - D2, except possibly
in the following subcase: if fP(Q)ql < J (D1 exits if U2 - D2 merge and U1
does not rescue D 1) and P(Q)ql - J - E < (l-f')(P(Q)Q - P(ql)q1 ) (U1 does not
rescue D ), the incentives for U - D1 to preempt U2 - D2 and for U2 - D2 to
preempt U1 - D1 are equal. The idea is that whoever preempts the other, the
nonintegrated downstream firm exits, and therefore the preemption game is a
"zero-sum game" (what one gains, the other loses). In that case, preemption
occurs at the date at which each is indifferent between preempting and not
preempting.26
Note finally that in contrast to Section 4 there are no "public good"
aspects to mergers here (the nonmerging downstream firm suffers from lack of
supplies and the nonmerging upstream firm may suffer from the exit of its
downstream partner). Hence, neither U1 - D1 nor U2 - D2 ever wants the other
to move first, i.e. there cannot be a war of attrition.
Remark 1. To keep the variant relatively simple, we have ignored upstream
investments. An implication of this is that vertical mergers have no effect
on consumers: in all the subcases of Proposition 20, Q units are supplied
to consumers and price is P(Q). Allowing upstream investments would not
alter the "first-round" effects of a U1 - D1 merger since such a merger has
no effect on U2's profits. However, if D2 exits as a result of the merger,
this will reduce U2's profits and might cause U2 to exit. In other words, a
"sequence" of exits is a possible outcome when upstream and downstream firms
both invest. Under these conditions, supplies will disappear from the market
and consumer prices will rise.
26U I - D1 and U 2 - D2 then have equal probabilities of preempting: see
Fudenberg-Tirole (1985) for the formalization of the continuous-time
preemption strategies. The date (-T) at which preemption occurs is given by:
E - erT[P(q)q + f'(P(Q)Q - P(q 1)q 1 ) - (1-f')(P(Q)Q - P(q 2 )q 2 )] , where E
is now taken to be a stock rather than a flow.
There is another new possibility that arises when upstream firms invest.
Whereas U1 - D1 always benefit from D2 's exit (this increases DI's monopsony
power), U1 - D1 may suffer from U2's exit since scarce supplies disappear from
the market. Hence in some cases U1 - D1 may refrain from merging in order to
keep U2 alive.2 7
Welfare.
The welfare effects of a merger are straightforward in the Scarce
Supplies variant. Since, in the absence of upstream investments, total output
is always Q, consumers neither gain nor lose from mergers. Firms lose in the
aggregate to the extent that merger costs are incurred, but gain to the extent
that investment costs J are saved (e.g. if U1 - D1 merge and D2 exits, the net
gain is J - E). Since, under partial or full integration, merger costs are
incurred without investment costs being saved, these cases are always
dominated by nonintegration.
Once upstream investments are allowed, consumers will generally be
affected by mergers. In particular, under the maintained hypothesis that all
firms invest under nonintegration, a merger by U1 - D1 that leads to D2 and U2
both exiting will cause a fall in total supply from Q to q1, and a
2 7One case where U - D1 will barely be hurt by U2's exit and hence will not
refrain from merging is when P(ql)ql = P(Q)Q. This is because even if D2 and
U2 exit, U1 - D1 achieve P(ql)ql - E and this is almost as much as they
receive if only D1 exits (i.e., V d). Hence for this case the presence of
upstream investments will not change the analysis at all. Moreover, if
feP(Q)q 2 < J and (1-8') P(Q)Q - P(q)q 1< I, i.e. D2 and U2 both exit, there
will be a clear effect on consumers from U1 - D1's merger: output will fall
from Q to ql and price will rise from P(Q) to P(ql ) .
corresponding price rise from P(Q) to P(ql ) .
7. Applications.
In this section, we discuss the application of our model to three
industries. The discussion is only meant to suggest how one might analyze
these industries using our framework; needless to say, the evidence on
vertical integration in these industries was not collected with this kind of
model in mind.
Case #1: The Cement and Ready-Mixed Concrete Industries.
Background. The cement industry consists of kilns and mills which convert
limestone, clay and gypsum into cement. The ready-mixed concrete industry
combines cement, sand, aggregates and water in the correct proportions to make
concrete. In the early 1960s, a large amount of vertical integration occurred
between the cement industry and the ready-mixed industry. In particular, a
large number of cement companies integrated forward by acquiring ready-mix
concrete companies. This heightened merger activity attracted the attention
of the Federal Trade Commission, and they conducted an inquiry into the merger
wave, resulting in the Economic Report on Mergers and Vertical Integration in
the Cement Industry [1966].
Characteristics of the Cement and Concrete Industries. Cement is a very
homogeneous commodity. It is manufactured to strict specification. There are
no problems of customer-specific investment, and any ready-mixed concrete
manufacturer can easily turn to an alternative supplier of cement.
Because of large minimum efficient scale, concentration in the cement
industry was very high. Since cement is bulky and costly to transport,
ninety percent of all cement was shipped 160 miles or less [FTC Report, p.
7]. And, even at the state level (which may be larger than actual market
areas), in only six percent of the states did the four largest suppliers
account for less than fifty percent of cement shipments.
Concentration in the downstream industry (ready-mixed concrete) was
apparently lower; however, the industry consisted of a few large firms
handling large contracting jobs (i.e., highways and bridges) and many small
firms handling smaller jobs. As a result, in seventeen of 22 metropolitan
areas for which the FTC had data, the four leading ready-mixed companies
accounted for 75 percent or more of ready-mixed sales [FTC Report, p. 13].
The period immediately after World War II saw a steady growth in demand
for cement with no corresponding increase in capacity. As a result, by 1955,
cement mills were operating at 94% of capacity.28 In response, existing cement
mills were expanded and new mills constructed so that by 1960 the capacity
utilization rate was down to 74%.
The merger wave in the cement and concrete industry seems to have been
triggered by significant excess capacity among cement mills. From 1955 to
1965, the cement industry expanded capacity by sixty percent -- twice as fast
as actual shipments of cement grew during that time period.29 This burst in
cement mill construction and expansion was a response to high capacity
utilization levels in the early 1950s, which resulted in spot shortages of
28Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Mergers and Vertical Integration
in the Cement Industry (henceforth referred to as FTC Report), p. 1.
29Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1965, p. 1.
cement. Demand continued to grow throughout the 1960s, but because so much
new capacity was brought on line, cement manufacturers saw their excess
capacity cut into industry profits. Eighty percent of the vertical
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acquisitions occurred when market conditions were weak. 37 of 55 vertical
integrations took place in markets with above-average excess capacity.3 1
Another factor contributing to the overcapacity was technological change
making newer cement mills cheaper to operate. New technology also made it
feasible to build ever-larger plants. By modernizing to cut costs, cement
makers contributed to the industry-wide overcapacity. Neither demand
conditions nor innovations in the downstream (concrete) market seem to have
played an important role in triggering mergers.
Pattern of Integration. The sixties witnessed a wave of acquisitions of
concrete manufacturers by cement producers. The acquired ready-mixed
companies made between nineteen percent and 45 percent of total ready-mixed
sales in their respective market areas (see FTC Report, p. 13, p. 98).
It is generally agreed that each acquiring cement producer hoped to
assure itself of guaranteed outlets (e.g., FTC Report, p. 14, Allen 11971], p.
254); efficiency reasons do not seem to have been an important factor (Allen
[1971], p. 253, fn. 76], Wilk [1968, p. 633-636], FTC Report, p. 3).
Bandwagoning occurred in many markets. All the executives' comments (to
the extent that they are "incentive compatible") point to the fact that
bandwagoning companies had been driven to purchase their customers because
30FTC Report, p. 98.
31Allen [1971].
their competitors were doing likewise. For example, in its Annual Report of
1963, the Alpha Portland Cement Company stated,
Vertical integration within our industry has been on the
increase in recent years. Alpha is presently not inclined
to integrate vertically. However, if our position in the
industry is put in jeopardy as a result of such corporate
arrangements, 5ere will be no alternative but to make
similar moves.
Wilk [1968] also cites evidence that many cement firms dropped out of a
market after a large customer had been bought out by competing cement
manufacturers.
Link with our Analysis. The pattern of integration in the cement industry
suggests that the relevant variant is the Scarce Needs one (see in particular
the extension of the Scarce Needs model in which downstream firms have limited
capacity). Upstream firms were eager to assure a downstream outlet. The
bottleneck seems to have been the downstream industry.
Also consistent with the Scarce Needs variant are the facts that the
complaining firms were cement producers; and that the mergers affected the
largest ready-mixed concrete firms.
One prediction of the Scarce Needs model is not borne out by the facts.
While the acquired ready-mixed companies substantially increased the fraction
of their supply obtained from the acquiring cement companies after the
mergers, from 37 percent to 69 percent (as the theory would predict), they
still purchased some of their supplies from other cement suppliers. In
3 2Quoted in FTC Report, p. 2.
contrast, the Scarce Needs variant has all supplies produced by the internal
manufacturer. This particular prediction, however, relies on constant returns
to scale upstream; and while there was excess capacity in the cement industry,
there may have been capacity constraints at the individual cement producer
level. The theory of Section 5 could be modified (by increasing the number of
upstream firms, allowing for individual but not industry capacity constraints)
so as to account for the possibility of outside supplies.
Based on the executives' interviews and annual reports (FTC Report,
p. 2 and 3, Allen [1971, pp. 267-270]), the type of relevant bandwagoning
behavior seems to have been reluctant bandwagon.
One may of course wonder why integration took place in the sixties, and
not earlier. As we noted, a primary determinant of the merger activity was
the excess capacity in the cement industry, which appeared in the sixties. It
should be noted that before this wave of forward integration, there were some
instances of backward integration into cement manufacture by concrete makers.
Typically, a large concrete maker would build a modern cement mill from
scratch and use most of the cement produced to meet its own needs. These
backward moves were initiated during the late 1950s, when cement was very
profitable because of the limited capacity in the industry. Concrete makers'
profits were squeezed by the high price of cement and the highly competitive
nature of the concrete business, which held concrete prices down. That is,
the relevant model for the late fifties may have been the Scarce Supplies
variant. However, the gains from foreclosure seem to have been smaller in
the fifties than in the sixties.
Finally, it would be interesting to know whether the FTC and the various
commentators, in dismissing efficiency reasons for mergers, had recognized the
possibility of hold-up problems in the cement industry. That is, it is
possible that at a time of excess capacity, a number of cement producers would
no longer have been viable in the absence of integration; they would have
exited if they could not have combined with a concrete firm. This would
provide an efficiency motive for mergers, which might offset the foreclosure
effects emphasized here. More information is required to tell whether this
efficiency effect could have been large. As noted in the Introduction,
however, the fact that the mergers involved large cement and concrete firms
provides some support for the foreclosure effect being the relevant one.
Case #2 Computer Reservation Systems
a) Background. Computer reservation systems (CRS) perform the electronic
booking of airline seats. The CRS industry was vertically integrated with
airlines from its inception. The two largest systems are Sabre, owned by
American Airlines, and Apollo, controlled by United Airlines. TWA, Texas Air
and Delta have competing CRS. Although CRS typically listed flights of most
other airlines than their controlling airlines or "hosts", by 1984 there had
been widespread complaints that the CRS were biased in favor of the host
airlines, neutral vis a vis the airlines that did not compete with the host
airlines and biased against the airlines competing with the host airlines.
For example, it seems that a substantial fraction of Continental's market was
diverted by CRS bias. The bias was partly monetary; in 1981-82, American
charged Eastern Airlines $0.24 per segment booked on Sabre. It charged Delta
$1.32 per booking, and New York Air paid $2.00 per booking. Eastern was a
large carrier that did not compete fiercely with American. It was charged a
low rate to give Sabre wider coverage, making Sabre more attractive to travel
agents. Delta competed with American at its Dallas hub, and there is
evidence that American wanted to drive Delta out of Dallas/Fort Worth. New
York Air was charged an even higher price, because it was a price cutter.
Another important element of discrimination concerned the order of display of
flights on the travel agent's screen. This order is crucial as travel agents
have little time and willingness to screen through several displays. Being
listed early provides a major competitive advantage for an airline.
In 1984, eleven airlines which were not integrated into the CRS
industry filed an antitrust suit against American and United, charging them
with monopolization of CRS. In November 1984, the Civils Aeronautics Board
established regulations for the purpose of guaranteeing more equal access to
CRS. We are primarily interested in the pre-November 1984 period.
b) Analysis. One way of looking at the industry is to regard the CRS as an
upstream firm with, possibly, scarce supplies. The CRS supplies an
input (flight booking) to downstream firms, the airlines, who set prices for
flights to consumers. For simplicity, we will analyze the industry using the
paradigm of an upstream monopolist (an "essential facility") serving several
downstream competitors. Clearly there is competition in the CRS segment, but
this competition is imperfect, and furthermore, a travel agent usually
consults a single CRS when serving a customer. Thus insights can be gleaned
from the essential facility paradigm.
What are the efficiency gains of vertical integration? We are not
aware of convincing arguments that they are substantial, but they may exist
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and further research is needed to see whether this is the case. The
integrated CRS and airline can derive three other types of benefits. First,
the host airline may favor its own flights by biasing display in their favor
and against rival flights. This gives rise to an ex-post monopolization
effect, as we discuss shortly. Second, the host airline may acquire real
time access to all prices and seat availability and thus get an edge over its
competitors who get the information later. The implications of this effect
are less clear than those of the first, but they relate to an ex-post
competitive advantage as well. Third, the integrated CRS will give priority
to the host airline and thus does not leave bargaining rents to other
airlines.
How do the first and third gains fit in our model? To take an extreme
example, suppose that there is a single CRS and two airlines. Assume first
that i) there are two priority lines on the screen allowing the CRS to
display two flights (other lines require another display for the travel agent
and do not sell in this extreme case) and ii) priority is not contractible.
A customer's preferred departing time to go from city A to city B is noon,
and the two airlines each have such a flight. A nonintegrated CRS will list
the two airlines' noon flights (it is actually indifferent between doing this
and listing two flights of the same airline as it does not receive
compensation for priority, but it is reasonable to assume that it displays
the noon flights of the two airlines if it receives some small benefit from
pleasing travel agents or helping both airlines stay alive). Knowing this,
3 3It is sometimes argued that computer interconnections between the CRS and
the airlines can be improved through vertical integration; it is unclear,
however, why the same coordination could not be achieved under
nonintegration via a contract.
the two airlines will compete fiercely in the price of their noon flight. In
contrast, if the first airline and the CRS merge, the CRS will exhibit this
airline's noon and 2 PM flights, and will relegate the other airline's noon
flight to a lower, non-selling ranking. Facing less competition, the first
airline can raise its price on the noon flight, and the customer as well as
the rival airline are hurt.
The story we just told is one of ex-post monopolization. Take now
another extreme case in which i) there is a single priority line on the
screen (all other lines are not conspicuous enough to sell) and ii) priority
can be contracted upon between an airline and the CRS. The issues described
above of the unintegrated CRS being unable to commit to give priority to a
single airline disappears. Here there is the "scarce supplies" issue raised
in Section 6. An unintegrated CRS leaves some bargaining gains to each
airline when selling the scarce supply, i.e. the single line on the screen,
and one airline's gain can be recaptured by the CRS vertically integrating
with the other airline.
The assumptions underlying the ex-post monopolization and scarce
supplies effects here seem inconsistent. However, we suggest that reality is
a mixture of the two situations. First, priority was partly contractible
before 1984. The ordering of display was computed through a complex system
of penalties; penalty for not being the host airline, penalty for differences
with desired departure time of customer, penalty for stops and connecting
flights, etc. Airlines could reduce the level of non-host penalty by
becoming a "co-host". However they could not fully contract on priority as
the CRS could often make minor adjustments to its algorithm to bias priority,
e.g. decide which connections are listed, change the algorithm when
introducing new flights, issue boarding passes only for the host airline,
shave schedule times, break ties in favor of airlines who have certain flight
numbers ... We thus conclude that priority had both contractible and
non-contractible elements. Second, whether the supply of screen space for
relevant flights is scarce depends on the route, the time of day, the season,
etc. Thus, we would expect space on the screen to be sometimes scarce (as in
our one-line example) and sometimes not (as in our two-line example). 34
Case #3: Terminal Railroad Case US vs. Terminal Railroad Association, 224,
US 383 (1912)
Terminal Railroad is the quintessential example of an essential
facility:
"The Terminal Company controlled a bridge across the
Mississippi River, and the approaches and terminal at St.
Louis, a very significant junction point for competing
railroads. That company had every incentive to serve
equally all railroads entering or leaving St. Louis,
charging whatever the market or regulatory agencies would
bear. However, once the Terminal Company was acquired by
several of those railroads, the new owners might use
their control over it to exclude or prejudice their
rivals. Rather than order dissolution of the
combination, with restoration of the Terminal Company's
The contracting difficulties may also offer clues as to why the vertically
integrated outcome could not have been achieved through an exclusive dealing
contract between the CRS and the airline. After all, discriminatory rates and
penalties resemble partial exclusive dealing. One issue with exclusive
dealing is that ideally an independent CRS would have liked to give a low
penalty level to an airline together with the commitment to impose high
penalty levels to the rival airlines. Such an exclusionary practice, like
other forms of exclusive dealing contracts, would probably have been frowned
on by the courts. Another issue is that, as we mentioned, display bias is
only partially contractible, so that some of the private gains to exclusionary
behavior are best realized through vertical integration. And indeed, only
one, short-lived, attempt was made by a non-airline-owned CRS to compete,
which suggests that integrated CRS yielded more profits.
independence, the Supreme Court required the members to
admit their railroad competitors to their consortium.
Although the Court did not use the word, we might
describe the Terminal Company's bridge, tracks, and
terminals as "essential facilities" that had to be shared
with competitors." (Areeda-Hoovenkamp [1987, ¶.736.1b]).
One can view the Terminal Company as an upstream monopolist and the
competing railroads as downstream rivals. Note that strategic vertical
integration by an upstream essential facility cannot be driven by scarce
needs downstream. Because there is a single supplier, integration of a U and
a D appropriates no bargaining surplus from other suppliers. Thus, absent
efficiency gains, forward integration by an upstream monopolist may be driven
either by the ex-post monopolization effect or by the scarce supplies effect.
Scarce supplies seemed to play no role in this case. According to
Areeda and Hovenkamp, "[the Terminal Company's] minimum efficient scale could
accommodate all the traffic". Although we have little evidence about this,
efficiency considerations also seemed secondary. [Furthermore, if there had
been efficiency gains from vertical integration, one would have to explain why
these gains would not also have applied to the excluded railroads in which
case joint ownership of the Terminal Company by all the railroads would have
been optimal -- see, e.g., the discussion in Hart and Moore [1988], Section
4.4.] Thus a first look at the Terminal Railroad case suggests that the motive
for integration was to monopolize the rail market around St. Louis.
8. Review of the Literature
In this section we compare our analysis to the literature on vertical
integration and foreclosure -- in particular the contributions of Ordover,
Saloner and Salop (OSS, 1990), Salinger (1988) and Bolton and Whinston
(1989).
OSS's model is effectively a special case of our first variant in which
C1 - c2 . In contrast to our analysis, they find that vertical integration can
be profitable under these conditions. OSS argue that, under nonintegration,
price competition in the intermediate and output markets leads to the standard
Bertrand product market outcome. In contrast, if upstream firm U1 and
downstream firm D1 merge, OSS argue that U2 can raise its input price to D2
since U1 will no longer be as anxious to supply the rival downstream firm D2
as before. This disadvantages D2 as a competitor in the product market and
35
allows U - D1 to increase their market share and make positive profit. In
other words, vertical integration forecloses product market competition by (in
the words of Salop-Scheffman [1983]) "raising rivals' costs."
The OSS analysis makes implicit assumptions about commitment and/or
contracting possibilities which are questionable. OSS assume that when U1
D1 merge they can commit not to supply rival D2 at a price below p, where p
is a choice variable for U1 and D 
. 
U2 and D2 then decide whether to merge.
OSS show that U1 and D1 commit to a price p above marginal cost c. In
equilibrium, U 2 slightly undercuts p to p - e and supplies D2 . U1 - D1 has
thus succeeded in raising D2 's marginal cost. p cannot be too large however
because the shrinking of D2 's market share would induce U2 - D2 to merge as
well.
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, if two part-tariffs
are allowed (as in our analysis), U2 and D2 always have an incentive to
3 5In fact, because competition between U1 and U2 becomes less fierce, the
nonintegrated upstream firm U2 also benefits from the merger (i.e., makes
positive profit) in equilibrium.
transfer the intermediate good at marginal cost and bargain over a fixed fee.
Thus in the presence of two part-tariffs, U1 - D1 cannot affect D2's marginal
cost and hence market competition. Second, U1 - D1's commitment is unlikely
to be believable. Why wouldn't U1 - D1 under-cut U2 by c in turn? The
effect on D2 's reaction curve is negligible (of the order of c), while U1
D1's increased profit from supplying D2 is significant (it is approximately
(p-c)q, where q is the quantity U2 sells to D2). Thus U1 - D1 can gain from
such a deviation ex-post, and any commitment ex-ante not to make such a
deviation lacks credibility. This is in spite of the fact that competitive
undercutting of this type leads inexorably to the Bertrand outcome and thus
eliminates all the benefits from U1 - D1 's integrating.
Note that we are not suggesting that it is never feasible for an
upstream firm to commit to charge high prices to a downstream firm. One way
this could be achieved is via a form of exclusive dealing contract (see the
Introduction and Appendix 3); another is through reputation. What is unclear
from OSS, however, is (a) what the mechanism for enforcing commitments is; (b)
why U1 - D1 need to merge to take advantage of this mechanism. That is, if
exclusive dealing contracts, say, are feasible, why cannot U1 write such a
contract with D1 to restrict supplies to D2, while remaining independent?
3 6
OSS also obtain different conclusions from ours. Our model explains
why firms sometimes respond to a merger by merging as well; how it can be
profitable for an integrated upstream firm to sell to a rival downstream
3 6Several papers have in fact studied the use of exclusive dealing contracts
to foreclose markets; see, e.g., Comanor and Frech [1985], Mathewson and
Winter [1986] and Schwartz [1987] (these papers, however, put restrictions on
the types of non-exclusive dealing contracts that can be offered). Also, see
Krattenmaker-Salop [1986] for a very good discussion of the law and economics
of exclusive dealing.
firm; and why an upstream firm and downstream firm may merge to drive a rival
out of the market. In contrast, bandwagoning never occurs in the OSS model
(at most one pair of firms are integrated); integrated and nonintegrated
firms never trade with each other; and, since a nonintegrated upstream firm
benefits from integration by its rival, an upstream firm might refrain from
integration in order to monopolize the market ex-ante (in the presence of
investment costs). Finally our model yields predictions on which firms are
more likely to integrate (those with lower marginal costs, lower investment
costs, or higher capacities), whereas OSS are silent on this since they
consider identical firms.
Salinger's [1988] model is similar to OSS's in several respects.
Salinger makes the same technological assumptions as OSS, but assumes that a
large number of upstream and downstream firms interact in an anonymous market.
The downstream firms take the intermediate good price as given in their input
decisions, but act as Cournot oligopolists in the consumer good market. The
upstream firms in turn act as Cournot oligopolists in the intermediate good
market. Salinger argues that, if U and D merge, U no longer supplies
intermediate good to the anonymous market, preferring instead to channel it to
D. Similarly, D no longer purchases input in the anonymous market preferring
instead to be supplied by U. The consequence of this withdrawal is that the
size and competitiveness of the anonymous sector falls and in equilibrium the
intermediate good price rises. Competitors of the merging downstream firms
are disadvantaged, while D's willingness to supply in the output market
increases since it now receives input at marginal cost. Under some
conditions, the result is a fall in the total output supplied by merged and
unmerged firms.
A problem with Salinger's model is that his conclusion that if U and D
merge, U supplies only D is based on a particular conjecture that U is assumed
to make: if U reduces its supply to a rival downstream firm, other upstream
firms will not make up the difference. We exploit a similar idea in our
Scarce Supplies variant, but derive it under the assumption that upstream
firms are capacity constrained. Salinger's model does not have this feature.
A strategy that Salinger does not permit is for an integrated supplier to
undercut its nonintegrated rivals slightly, so that nonintegrated purchasers
buy the same total amount as before, but now from the integrated supplier.
Yet a price-cutting strategy seems natural, particularly in the context of
many trading relationships between upstream and downstream firms that are
personalized rather than anonymous, and where price-setting, possibly in
conjunction with quantity- setting, seems more plausible than pure
quantity-setting.
Finally, we turn to a recent paper by Bolton-Whinston (BW, 1989),
written independently of ours. BW also study the motives for vertical
integration from an incomplete contracting perspective, but mainly in a
situation where downstream firms operate in different product markets. Their
basic model consists of two downstream firms D1, D2 and one upstream firm U.
The downstream firms make (variable) investments specific to the upstream
firm, but the upstream firm does not invest. Each downstream firm requires
one unit of intermediate good from the upstream firms ex-post; the upstream
firms can satisfy both downstream firms in some states of the world, but in
others it has only one unit of intermediate good available. Long-term
contracts cannot be written and ex-post bargaining is modelled as an
extensive form game, where the ability of the upstream firm U to sell to D.
plays the role of an outside option in the bargaining between U and D . In
contrast to our model, investment costs are not shared under integration and,
in addition, the returns to investment are completely appropriated by a
firm's owner.
In the case where the upstream firm has only one unit of intermediate
good available, the BW model is close to our Scarce Supplies variant. The
motive for integration in their model is different, however. If D1 buys U,
this has no direct effect on D2 's investment decision since, (assuming the
outside option binds), if D2 values the intermediate good more than D1, D2
will continue to buy it at a price equal to D1 's willingness to pay.
However, there is an indirect effect due to the fact that D1 now appropriates
all the returns from U's bargaining with D2 and so has an incentive to invest
more in order to increase these returns; this in turn causes D2 to invest
less. 37
Given that the motive for integration is different in their model, it
is not surprising that BW also reach different conclusions. BW find that,
when outside options are binding in the bargaining process, nonintegration is
socially optimal. The reason is that, given that each downstream firm pays
an input price determined by the other downstream firm's willingness to pay,
it receives at the margin the full increase in the marginal product of its
investment. (In contrast, in Section 6, we find that either nonintegration
or vertical integration and exit can be socially optimal.) However, when
outside options are binding, nonintegration is not privately optimal in BW's
37BW also consider a form of bandwagoning, whereby a merger of U and D1 causes
D2 to build upstream capacity so as to supply its internal needs.
model: by integrating, U and one of the downstream firms can make themselves
better off at the expense of the other downstream firm. In fact, BW find
that the only privately optimal arrangements involve vertical integration by
U and one of the D's, or complete integration of U, D1 and D2 . (In contrast,
we do not allow complete integration, and find that, when q2 - 0 (i.e., there
is only one upstream firm), either nonintegration, or integration between U
and D., with or without exit of Dj, can be privately optimal.)
A final difference between the two models is that, in BW's consumer
surplus is independent of ownership structure (for example, if downstream
firms make take it or leave it offers to consumers, consumer surplus equals
zero). In contrast, in our Scarce Supplies variant, exit by a downstream firm
can lead to exit by an upstream firm, and thereby to a fall in total supplies
and a decrease in consumer surplus (see Remark 1 of Section 6).
8. Concluding Remarks
We conclude with two brief, possible extensions of the model.
1. Our analysis is couched in terms of integration between a supplier and a
buyer. However, it seems likely to extend to integration between two
manufacturers of complementary products A and B. Suppose manufacturer Al
merges with B1. By doing this, A makes it credible that it will give
information about developments of its products only to B1 , thus allowing B1 an
early start in the design of compatible complements. [In contrast, a
nonintegrated firm will have an incentive to give all B manufacturers this
information in order to create more competition in the market for the
complement.] Vertical integration may help A - B1 through two channels.
First, if the goods are not pure complements, as in the case when some
consumers buy product B only or when B is consumed in variable proportions,
A 's limiting its "supplies of information" to B1 increases B 's market power
(for instance by forcing its rivals to exit). Second, whether goods A and B
are pure complements or not, Al - BI 's merging may force other B manufacturers
to exit. A1 may then be able to monopolize the A market by tying products Al
and B1 or, equivalently, by making Bl's product incompatible with other A
manufacturers' products. Very tentative applications (tentative because we
haven't studied the industries in detail) are IBM's limiting early
announcements of its developments in computer technology to its disk drive
subsidiary, or airlines offering complementary flights gaining market power by
facilitating exclusive coordination of schedules at hubs.
2. We have assumed that the upstream firms were subject to either constant
returns to scale (first two variants) or decreasing returns to scale (third
variant). An interesting extension of our model would allow for upstream
increasing returns to scale over some range (as in the case of a U-shaped cost
curve). A (possibly hypothetical) illustration is the following: the
Japanese owners of supercomputers by buying supercomputers exclusively from
Japanese manufacturers (e.g., as a result of vertical integration) reduce the
size of the market for US supercomputer manufacturers, whose unit production
costs therefore rise. As a consequence, the US consumers of supercomputers
forego some use of them and hence are at a disadvantage relative to their
Japanese competitors in the product market. This story is quite similar to
our ex-post monopolization variant, except that vertical integration not only
enables the most efficient supplier (which is ex-post the Japanese
manufacturers of supercomputers) to commit to restrict supplies (to US
consumers of supercomputers), but also creates the upstream cost differential
that was assumed exogenous in Sections 3 and 4. Note that the story also
possesses some features of our Scarce Needs variant (in that variant a merger
between an upstream and downstream firm could disadvantage the rival
downstream firm by causing exit of the rival upstream firm -- this is an
extreme example of the upstream firm's unit production costs rising).
Appendix 1:
Proof of Proposition 1
* *
The strategies are: U1 offers to sell q units at t to each D
* * *
(formally: tlj(qlj) - t if qlj ' q  - + if qij q ). U2 offers to supply
each Dj at marginal cost (that is, t2j(q 2 j) - c 2 q2 for j - 1,2). Each
downstream firm accepts (t ,q ) in equilibrium. If one of the upstream firms
offers another contract to D, this D continues to anticipate output q by its
rival and maximizes its profit (that is, it maximizes
A A A A
r(qlj+q2j, q )-t ql1jQlj)-t2j(q2jQ2j) subject to qlj+q2j > max(Q l j ,Q2j)).
The downstream firms' behavior is obviously optimal given the offers it
faces and given that it expects its rival to purchase q
Can U2 deviate and make a positive profit? For instance, can it sell q22
at price t2 2 > c2 22 to D2? Note that D2 can guarantee itself DNI(cl,c2 -
r(R2(q ),q )-c2R2(q ) by refusing U2's offer and purchasing q at price t
Because R2( q ) is the best response to q for marginal cost c2 , D2 would get
strictly less than DN (cl,c 2 ) by buying q2 2 at price t2 2 > c2q2 2 and rejecting
offer (q ,t ) from U1. Similarly, because R2 (q ) q (as c2 > C1), q22 - 0
+N *I
maximizes r(q +q22, q )-c2 22, and thus D2 makes strictly less than D NI(c 1 ,c2 )
if it buys from U1 and furthermore buys q22 at price t2 2 > c2q2 2 from U2.
Last, can U1 increase its profit? No, because it is already maximizing
tlj-clqlj subject to the constraint r(qlj,q )-tlj 2 r(R2(q ),q )-c2R2(q)
over pairs (qlj ,tlj). Thus, it extracts the maximum feasible surplus from
each Dj given that the latter can buy at marginal cost c2 and expects its
rival to buy q
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2
The strategies are: U1 offers q2 at price t2 to D2 . U2 offers to supply
at marginal cost (t2j(q2j) 
- c2q2j for all j and q2j). In equilibrium, D2
buys q2 from U1 and 0 from U2.
Again, it is clear that D2 acts optimally given the contract offers and
the anticipation that D1 procures q1 internally.
Can U2 make a strictly positive profit? Suppose that U2 makes a
different offer and D2 buys q22 at price t2 2 > c2q2 2 from U2 . Then D2's
profit is max(r(q 2+q 22,q1 )-c2q2 -t2 2 ,r(q2 2,q1 )-t2 2 ). Because q2 - R2(ql) and
t22 > c2q22, this profit is strictly lower than DPI(clc2) and D2 is better
off rejecting U2's contract after all.
Can (U1-D1) make more than VP I (c l ,c 2 )? Suppose that U1 offers a
different contract to D2. Let (Q1 ,Q2) denote the resulting outputs for D1 and
D2 , which we for the moment assume deterministic. First, note that Q1
R1(Q2), as (U1 -D1) can procure internally at marginal cost cl and externally
at marginal cost c2. Furthermore, Q2 > R2(Q1 ) as D2 can buy any amount from
U2 at marginal cost c2. We thus have Q1 ql Q2  q2 and Q2 q+q 2 from
dq < 1 (see Figure 1). Thus industry profits are lower than in our
dq2
presumed equilibrium. Yet D2 can guarantee itself D P(c 1 ,c2 ) because by
turning down Ul's offer it obtains max(r(q 2 2,Q1)-c2q2 2 ) Ž max(r(q 2 2,ql)-c 2q 2 2
q22 q22
- D (c1 ,c2). Hence industry profits have fallen, while U2 and D2 are at
least as well off. Hence (U1-D1) cannot increase its profit. This reasoning
extends straightforwardly to random outcomes (QQ2). First note that Q1 is
necessarily deterministic (equal to some Q1) as it maximizes the strictly
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concave function 0 (r(Q1 ,Q2 )-C1Q1 ), where C denotes the expectation operator.
Q2
Furthermore any realization Q2 of Q2 exceeds R2(Q1). Let Q2 be the infimum in
the support of Q2. 92 2 R2(Q1) and Q1 R1(Q92) (recall that reaction curves
are downward sloping). This implies that Q2 > q2 and Q, S q1 (see Figure 1).
PI e - *
Hence, D2 can guarantee itself D (c1 ,c2). Let Q2 2  2 2 denote the
expectation of Q2. Our assumption that a firm's marginal revenue is convex in
the other firm's output and the fact that marginal revenue is decreasing in Q1
imply that Q, 2 R,(Q2). This inequality, together with Q 2 R2(Q,), implies
e *
that QI+Q2 1 ql+q2 (see Figure 1). Last, because the industry profit function
is concave in total output, the upper bound on industry profit (which presumes
production efficiency) satisfies C(P(Q1+Q2)(Q1+Q 2)-c1 (Q 1+Q2))
P(Q+Q 2)(QI+Q2 )-c(QI+Q) P(ql+q 2 ) (q1+q 2)-cl(q 1 +q2). Hence, industry profit
is smaller, and so is the profit of (U1 -D1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
In equilibrium, U1 produces internally q1 and offers to supply q2 to D2
* *
at price t2 - c2q 2 . U2 does not supply. The proof is essentially that of
Proposition 2. The only possible point of departure comes from the fact that
U2 "supplies" D2 internally instead of externally. But this makes no
difference for the proof that (U1 -D1 ) cannot raise its profit as D2 can
already buy at marginal cost c2 from U2 under PII . We only have to check that
(U2-D2) cannot raise its profit by making an alternative offer to D1. Suppose
it does so. Because D1 and D2 can purchase internally at marginal cost, we
have Q1 R1 (Q2) and Q2 R2(Q1 ) (the case of random Q1 and Q2 is solved as
in Proposition 2). Thus industry profit can only be lower than the one
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obtained in Proposition 3. It thus suffices to check that even if U2 changes
its contract offer to D1 (which was to supply at marginal cost c2), (U1 -D1)
can guarantee itself V FI(cl,c 2 ) (gross of the efficiency loss). To see this,
note that if Q2 > R2(Q1 ), it is unprofitable for U2 to supply D2 any positive
amount internally, and so Q2 - q2; but then (Ul-D 1) can get V Fl(cc 2 ) by not
buying from U2 and producing ql internally. On the other hand, if Q2
R2(Q1)' Q2  2 q as Q1 e R1(Q2) (see Figure 1) and again (U1-D1) can get
V F(c 1 ,c2). Hence, (U2 -D2) cannot gain by offering a different contract to
D1I
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the following strategies: U2 offers to sell at marginal cost c2
to D1 up to q (t21(q21 ) - c2 21 for q21 q' + for q21 > q ). U1 offers
to sell q at price t to D2 (where q and t are as in Proposition 1). U1
offers to sell either q at price t or qll at price t11 (q1 1, ) -
* * * * ^ *
r(q ,q )-r(q -qll,q ) to D1 if D1 can exhibit total output Q1 q . In
equilibrium D1 buys q at price t from U1.
Note that U1 simply offers to make up the difference to q if D1 does not
buy q from U2 . First, we show that D1 cannot increase its profit. From the
definition of tll, if it buys q2 1 s q from U2, D1 has the same profit whether
it buys the complement to q from U1 or not. Its profit is thus
* * * * NIefinition of R 2
r(q21,q )-c2q21 5 r(R2 (q ),q )-c2q - D (c1,c2 ) (by definition of R2)'
Second, the proof that U1 cannot make more than UNI(cl,c 2 ) is the same as that
in Proposition 1: U2 and D2 are now integrated, but U2 continues to supply D2
at marginal cost c2.
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The third and more difficult part of the proof consists of showing that
(U2 -D2 ) cannot make more than DNI(c 1 ,c2 ). Suppose that U2 makes a different
contract offer to D 
. 
Suppose first that there exists no (q21,t21) in the new
* NI
contract such that r(q21 ,q )-t21 > D (c1,c 2 ); then specify that D1 turns down
U2's contract offer, buys q from U1 and that D2 buys q from U1 as well and
does not produce internally. This is clearly a continuation equilibrium and
it gives the same profit to (U2-D2 ) as before. Thus assume that there exists
* NI NI(q21 ,t21 ) such that r(q21 ,q )-t21 > D (c1 ,c2). The definition of D NI(c 1 ,c2)
implies that (U2-D2) does not make money on the trade as t21 s c2q21. Either
* *
q21 : q and then specify that D1 buys q21 at price t21 from U2 , q -q21 at
price tll( q -q21,q ) from U1 and that D2 buys q at price t from U1 and does
not produce internally. Again, this continuation equilibrium yields at most
NI *
D (c1 ,c2) to (U2 -D2 ). Or q21 > q , and suppose that in equilibrium D1 buys
q21 from U2 (the case of a random strategy for D1 is treated as in
Proposition 2). Then, Dl's total output Q1 r q2 1 and the profit of (U2 -D2)
. . . NIis at most max(r(Q2,q21 )-c2Q2 ) 5 r(R2 (q ),q )-c2R2(q ) - D (c1 ,c2 ) (buying
Q2
q from U1 is not a best response to Q1 as it yields r(q ,Q1)-t -
* * * NI NI
r(q ,Q1)-r(q ,q )+D (cc 2) < D (cl,c 2). We thus conclude that (U2 -D2 )
cannot increase its profit beyond DNI(c 1 c2 ).
Q.E.D.
Appendix 2:
Uniqueness. We look at (perfect Bayesian) equilibria in the following class:
1. The equilibrium is in pure strategies.
2. (Market by market bargaining). When a downstream firm Dk receives an
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out-of-equilibrium offer from an unintegrated upstream firm Ui. it does not
change its beliefs about U 's offer to DL (L o k).
3. (No money-losing offers): An unintegrated firm does not make an offer at
price below marginal cost (that is, that would lose money if accepted);
A A
t ij(qij,Q) ci.q..ij for all i,j,qij, Qij.
Let us comment on restrictions 2 and 3. Restriction 2, although not
implied by perfect Bayesian equilibrium, is a natural one. An unintegrated U
makes secret and independent offers to two downstream firms and tries to
extract the best deal from each of them. Because there is no "informational
leakage" from one customer to the other, the unintegrated U has no incentive
to change the offer to De when it changes its offer to Dk (and indeed
equilibrium behavior requires that it does not do so if its offer to De is
uniquely optimal). Note that no such restriction can be imposed for an
integrated U. When it changes its offer to its subsidiary's rival, it also
wants to change its supply to its subsidiary, with whom it shares profit.
Given restriction 2, restriction 3 is in the spirit of trembling-hand
perfection (Selten [1975]) of not allowing a player to play a weakly dominated
strategy. An offer that contains a money-losing pair is worse for U than the
same offer without it if there is a small probability that the downstream firm
chooses this money-losing pair.38
Note that the equilibria described in Section 3 satisfy restrictions 1
through 3.
3 8One might think that including the money-losing pair could act as a "sunspot"
and induce the downstream firm to choose among the non-money-losing pairs the
one that U prefers. However, this selection can also be made directly by U by
offering a single best pair to the downstream firm.
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Proposition A: (i) Under NI, FI, PII , Mu , Md and Mud, there exists a single
perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying restrictions 1 though
3.
(ii) Under PI2 , the equilibrium described in Proposition 4 is
undominated in the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria
satisfying 1 through 3. Furthermore, any other equilibrium
satisfying 1 through 3, if one exists, has U2 supply at a loss
to D1, D1 produce more than q , and the integrated firm U2-D 2
make less profit than in the equilibrium of Proposition 4.
We have been unable to prove or disprove uniqueness in the class
considered under PI2 . But if other equilibria exist, there are somewhat
pathological: U2 supplies at a loss its subsidiary's rival; such a behavior
might be plausible if D1 bought from U2 a quantity less than q and nothing
from UI . However, D1 ends up buying more than q , the amount it buys (from
U1) in the equilibrium of Proposition 4.
Let q1 and q2 denote D1 and D2's final outputs, and qij be Ui 's supply
to D. (qj ljq2k).
Nonintegration. Under market by market bargaining (restriction 2), U1 and
U2 are competing a la Bertrand for each D. separately. For instance, D 's
beliefs about q2 are fixed in a given equilibrium and do not depend on U1 and
U2's offers to D1. U 's best offer is then trivially the best reaction R1(q2)
to q2 at the highest price such that D1 does not want to buy from U2 . And
symmetrically for D2 . Hence the equilibrium outputs are q1 - q2 - q and the
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transfers to U1 equal t , where q and t are given in Proposition 1.
Full integration. Because integrated D's can procure internally at marginal
cost, qi a Ri(qj). Hence aggregate profit, gross of integration cost, l+72'
satisfies 71 + 2 5 r(ql, q2 ) + r(q2' ql) - cl(ql + q2 ) ' with equality if
and only if ql - q1 and q2 - q2 (i.e., if and only if ql - Rl(q 2 ) and q2
R2(q1)). It thus suffices to show that U1 - D1 can guarantee itself 1
r(ql' 2) - clq + (c2 - c1 )q2 , and that U2 - D2 can guarantee itself 2
r(q2, ql) - c2q2 . If this is so, the equilibrium outputs and profits are as
in Proposition 4.
* n
Suppose that firm 1 offers to supply D2 up to q2 at price tl2 (q 2)
n * * n n
where t 2(q2 ) - c2 2 , tl2 (q 2 ) < c2 q12 and lim tl2(1 2 ) - c2 q1 2 for 0 < q12 <
n-o
q2. That is, U1 offers to undercut U2 slightly up to 
q2. Figure 2 exhibits
D2 s reaction curve Rn (q2 ) coming from the maximization of r(q2,q1) - c2q22
n n coincides R l
t1 2 (q 1 2 ) subject to q 1 2 + q2 2 -2 R2 coincides with R2 for q1 s q, and,
* n
for n sufficiently large, is close to R2 for ql q1. Note that t12() can be
n
chosen so that R is continuous, which we will assume.2
Because U2 may make an offer to D1 , D1 's reaction curve R (q2 ) is
obtained by solving
Max r(ql,q 2 ) - clqll - t21 (q21 ,Q21)}
q11  q 21  1 q
subject to 1S1 a Q21
A
where we adopt the convention that t2 1(0,.) - 0. [Q2 1 denotes the quantity
exhibited to U2 by D1 .] By the standard revealed preference argument, R1(q2)
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(which need not be single valued) is monotonic (non-increasing). Furthermore
R1(q2) R 1(q2) (because D1 can always refrain from buying from U2). The
crucial feature of R is that it admits only horizontal jumps. Therefore R1
and Rn intersect for some q2  q2 (there may exist several such
2  2 2
intersections, but they all share this property). See Figure 2. This
implies that by buying q21 - 0, U1 - D1 can guarantee itself at least ~1 by
offering the above contract to D2 . The reasoning for why U2 - D2 can
guarantee itself 72 is symmetrical. It suffices that U2 offer no contract to
D1.
Figure 2 Here
Partial Integration PII . First note that the no-money-losing-offer
assumption implies that in equilibrium q1 - Rl(q 2 ): because the unintegrated
U2 does not supply under marginal cost c2 and D1 can procure internally at
marginal cost cl < c2, D1 only purchases internally and has reaction curve
R1
. 
Next we claim that q2 r R2(ql). For, suppose that q2 < R2(ql). Then U2
could increase its profit by offering to put D2 on its reaction curve. More
A A A
precisely, if q1 2 ' q2 2 ' Q1 2 and Q22 maximize r(q2 q1 ) - t1 2(q1 2,Q1 2) -
A A A
t2 2(q2 2 ',Q2 2 ) such that q1 2 + q2 2 - q2 and q2  1 Q12'Q2 2, then the contract
A
"R2(q) - q 1 2 at price t2 2 (q2 2,Q2) + r(R 2(q 1),' 1 ) - r(q 2,q1) - c" offered by
U2, where i is positive and small, is strictly preferred by D2 to rejecting
the contract and buying from U1 only, and yields a strictly higher profit to
U2, as is easily checked.
Because q1 - R1 (q 2 ) and q2 2 R2 (q 1 )' q1 1 q1 and q 2 > q2 and l1 1- n
with equalities if and only if - "7l To show that U1 - D1 can guarantee
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R1
R 2
(ql,q 2 )
Fiaure
a4
1I
R1
v
itself 7l, note that if it offers the schedule tl2(q 1 2 ) - (c2 -q)q 1 2 for all
q12 to D2 , where c is small, D2 will never buy from U2 (who makes no
money-losing offer) and has reaction curve R2(.) converging uniformly to R2
when c tends to 0. Thus, as c tends to 0, the Nash equilibrium when t12(.) is
offered to D2 by U1 converges to (ql, q2). We thus conclude that the unique
equilibrium satisfying our restrictions is the one exhibited in Proposition 2.
Partial integration PI2 . Note first that market-by-market bargaining (for
U1) implies that U1 sells q2 - R1(q1), at price c2q2 to D2. Second, we claim
that q1  R1(q2). Otherwise, U1 would put D1 on its reaction curve Rl(q 2)
(again, we invoke market-by-market bargaining). Furthermore q1 - Rl(q 2 ) if
q21 - 0. We thus conclude that either q1 - q2 - q and U1 supplies q at
price c2q to both D1 and D2, or ql > q > q2 and q21 > O. Uniqueness under
Mu, Md and Mud is straightforward. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Exclusive Dealing
We analyze exclusive dealing in the context of the model of Section 3.
We solve the ex-ante stage with deterministic costs under exclusive dealing
(ED) in order to point to the essential difference between ED and vertical
integration as means of foreclosing markets. In our model, ED allows an
upstream firm (Ul, say) to commit not to supply D2.
In a nutshell, ED has two drawbacks and one advantage relative to
vertical integration. It dominates vertical integration in that it allows
firms to remain independent and avoids the incentive loss E. The first
drawback, which we will not study but could be represented by a constant loss
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K given our constant returns-to-scale-assumption, is associated with the loss
of gains from trade between the upstream firm U1 and third parties (firms
outside the industry). Such a loss occurs if either shipments by U1 cannot
be monitored by D1 or if arbitrage between third parties and D2 cannot be
prevented; then the only credible way for U1 to cease trading with D2 is if
U1 promises not to trade with anybody but D1. Second, and more importantly
from the point of view of our model, ED implies production inefficiency.
Precisely when UI-D 1 gain by foreclosing the market (cl < c2), ED forces D2
to buy from the high-cost supplier. Hence, under ED, (U1 -D1) loses the
profit (c2 -c1)q2 obtained by selling q2 to D2 . Thus, ignoring the cost K of
not trading with third parties (for example, there exists no third party),
the total profit of U 1 plus D1 when c1 : c2 is:
ED (cl,c2) - r(ql,q 2)-clq 1  under ED
and
VP (clc2)-E - VF (c1 ,c2)-E - r(ql,q2)-clq1+(c2 -c1)q2 -E under vertical
integration.
Now, suppose that costs are deterministic and that cl 5 c2. Propositions
3 and 4 imply that (U2-D2) have no incentive to integrate whether U1 and D
are integrated or not. It is easy to see that U2 and D2 have no incentive to
sign an ED contract either. Assuming no exit occurs, the only possible
industry structures are NI, PI1 , and ED1 (ED contract between U1 and D1). The
optimal choice for (U1 -D1) between these three structures is given by:
Proposition B: Consider the deterministic case in which there are no
investments and thus exit does not occur. Assuming cl < c2,
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either of the three possible industry structures NI, PI1 and
ED1 may be optimal for (U1-D1), and thus arise. In particular:
(i) If c2 is close to c1 , NI is preferred to ED1 by
(U1 -D1) if the demand function is linear.
(ii) If c2 is much larger than cl, ED1 is preferred to NI.
(iii) If E is small, PI1 dominates both NI and ED1.
(iv) If E is large, PI1 is dominated by both NI and ED1.
Proof: (i) Note that VED (c,c 1 ) - UNI(Clcl)+D N(cC1 ), so (U1 -D1 ) is
indifferent between NI and ED1 in the symmetric case. Raising c2 above cl, we
obtain from the envelope theorem:
avED  ar 2 * * aq2
-c a - - F (P'(q1 +q 2) q c8c2  2 8c2  21 P2
while
a(uNI+DNI)
ac2  - R2( q (Cl))
Because at c2 - cl, q (cI) - R 1(q 2 ) - R2 (q (cl)), for linear demand one has
avED a(NI+DNI)
ac ac22 2
c2-c1 c 2-c1
(ii) Fixing c1 , define c2 as the lowest value of c2 such that q2 (c2 ,cl) - 0.
For c2 > c2' ED1 allows U -D1 to obtain the monopoly profit rm(c 2), while
(UNI(cl,c2 )+DNI(cl,c2 )) is bounded away from this monopoly profit (see
Proposition 1).
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(iii) It suffices to show that (U1 -D1 ) strictly prefers vertical integration
for E - 0 (by continuity, this will also hold for E small). That PI1 strictly
dominates NI for (U1 -D1) when E - 0 results from Proposition 2. And
V P(c,c 2) - VED (cl,c2)+(c2-c )q implies that PI dominates ED1 when E - 0
(for c2 < c2 ; for c2 > c2, ED1 and PI1 are equivalent if E - 0).
(iv) Trivial (E is incurred only under vertical integration).
Q.E.D.
Appendix 4:
Proof of Proposition 5
(ii): Proposition 5 is trivial in case (ii). From Propositions 1
through 4, the gain from integration occurs when c. - c and c. - +C, which has3.
a higher probability for i - 1 than for i - 2.
(i): To prove the Proposition for small uncertainty, we first show that
g(c ,cj ) is decreasing in c. and increasing in c.. Using the definition of
g(ci,cj ) and the envelope theorem, we have (for c. < cj):
ag(c.,c.) q * aq
S " P'(q +q )q ac. + qj + (cj-ci) --. - R.(q (c.)).ac. 2 j ic. j c. 1
In particular, because q (c,c) - Rj(q (c)),
8g(ci.,c.) * 8q
a C - P'(2q (c ))q * (ci ) A >  0.c. c.-c. i ac.
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Hence, g(ci ,c j ) is increasing in c. for small uncertainty. Next, we have
ag(ci,c.) * * * * aq
c i  - qi-q + [P'(q.+q.)qi + (c.-ci)] a-
ac. i j 1 31 j i c.
. 1
* dq *
2P'(2q (c)) q (ci) - 2q (c )-P'(q (ci)+R2(q (ci)))R2 (q c
In particular,
* *
8g(ci,c.) 8q. dq (c.i
- P'(2q (c.))q (c.) dia < 0,
8c. c.-c. 1 aci dc.i
* *
as qj- dq (c i ) > 0.dc. .1 1
Last, we note that if i < 0 and - > 0, then G(Fi ,F.) > G(F.,F.) if F.
ac. 8c. 1 1 1
first-order stochastically dominates F.. Because ag > 0, G(Fi,F j) >3 ac. 1
G(F.,F.). And because - < 0, G(F.,F.) > G(F.F.).G(F iF Fi).
Q.E.D.
Appendix 5:
Proof of Proposition 6
The inequality in Proposition 6 is an equality in the large uncertainty
case. U. and Di might suffer from integration by U. and D. only if c. - +w
NI
and c. - c (see Propositions 1 through 4). But in this case Di (+W,c) - 0
anyway.
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Consider next small uncertainty: As in Proposition 5, our strategy is
to show that !(ci,cj) is decreasing in cj and increasing in c. for c. > c..
We have
ae(c.,c) dq (c) aqj
ac. i - P'(Ri(q (c ))+ q (c ))Ri(q (c)) dc. P (qq)qi ac
At c. - c.:3 1
ae(c.,c.) dq (c ) aq.
ac. - P'(2q (c ))q (c ) -" < 0,
3 c.-c. aj .]
asdq - - > 0 (as is easily seen on a diagram). Hence, in the smalldc. ac.
uncertainty case, e(ci,cj) is decreasing in c.. Next,13 3
* * * * q.
- -R.(q (c ))+qi.P'(q.+q )q 8c
c-c 1 1 1 iac.C.C . 1c3
In particular:
ae(c. ,c.)
ac.
- - P'(2q (c ))q (cj) -ac > 0.
Sj ac.
Hence, e(ci,c.) is increasing in c. in the case of small uncertainty.13 81
ae aA
Last, if < 0, L(F ,F2 ) < L(F,F). And because a > 0, L(FF <
.L(F2,F ac
L(F2,F 1)1
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 6:
Proof of Proposition 9
(i) In the case of large uncertainty:
M d m P(c I dI. - a.(1-a.)Ir () > U.- a (1-ai)(21 (c))3 3 i 3 2.
d * * * m
where (c) - r(q (c),q (c))-cq (c) and it (c) a max (r(q,O)-cq).
(ii) Suppose that c. 5 c.. Then
M
U (c ,c.)-U (c ,c.) -
2[r(q (c.),q (c.))-cjq (c.)]-2[r(Ri(q (c.)),q (cj))
* Ifml I
-c.R.(q (c.))]-[r (c.)-Wm(ci )].
Keeping c. constant, let us take the derivative of this expression with
respect to c. at c. - c.:
11 j
(where we use the fact that in a symmetric Gournot equilibrium, total outputMM PPI  
d
exceeds the monopoly output). But U ,(c ) U d (c.,c.) - 0 for c. 2 c..
Hence, UPI (cjc.) >> U M(c ,c) for c. < c. and (c.-c.) small, which proves the3 c. 3 3
result in the case of small uncertainty.
Q.E.D.
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Appendix 7:
War of Attrition and Preemption in the Merger Game in the Ex-Post
Monopolization Variant.
PIWe assume large downstream investments (•P2 < J) (and small upstream
investments so as to focus on downstream monopolization) and show that two
polar cases of merger dynamics, war of attrition and preemption, may arise.
The point is that if uncertainty is large, a low-cost upstream firm is a
monopolist when its rival's cost is high. The low-cost firm's problem is
then to commit not to supply both downstream firms. One possibility for
commitment is that the low-cost supplier is integrated. Another is that one
of the downstream firms has exited. The upstream firm then benefits from
downstream monopolization and does not want to rescue a failing downstream
firm (Proposition 9). In this respect ex-ante monopolization by vertical
integration resembles a public good. Both upstream firms benefit from it,
and each firm prefers the other to trigger downstream exit and incur the
integration cost. This suggests the possibility of a war of attrition
between the upstream firms. There is a second consideration, however. When
both upstream firms costs are low the remaining buyer following ex-ante
monopolization enjoys a monopoly profit on the product market. Obviously,
each downstream firm would like to be the one that enjoys this monopoly
profit, which suggests that the merger game might resemble a game of
preemption. We show by means of symmetric examples that there is indeed a
conflict between these two effects. In the relevant range for the
integration cost, firms will wage a war of attrition if the integration cost
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is high, and will try to preempt each other if the integration cost is low,
resulting in late and early vertical integration respectively.
The Case of Symmetric, large uncertainty
Consider, in the ex-post monopolization variant, a slight modification
of the symmetric, large uncertainty case. Let c. - c with probability a and
c' with probability (l-a). Before, we assumed that c' - +p . Let us assume
that c' is slightly smaller than c where c is the smallest marginal cost such
that the Cournot output of a firm with cost c facing a firm with cost c is
equal to zero. The purpose of having c' lower than c or +w is to allow
downstream firms to suffer from integration. Let q (c) denote the Cournot
d * * *
output when both firms have cost c, (c) - r(q (c),q (c))-cq (c) denote the
Cournot profit, and m (c) = max (r(q,O)-cq) denote the monopoly profit. In
q
this symmetric example, we drop the subscripts under the expected profit
functions. The reader will easily check that the expected profits are:
NI: 1NI - a(l-a)2(d(c)-D NI(c,c'))
NI 2d 2d NI
DI - a r (c)+(l-a) r (c')+2a(l-a)D (c,c')
Md m m
Md: V - ar (c)+(l-a)m (c')
d m M dU1 - a(l-a)(m (c)-r (c')) < V
[Partial integration is not feasible if, as we will assume, J is sufficiently
big. Also, full integration will not occur if c' is close to c from
Propositions 9 and 10.] Because D (c,c') < DNI(c,c') (from Proposition 2),
NI PI
for any a, there exists J such that DNI > J > D -
a 2r (c)+(l-a) d(c')+a(l-a)D N I (c,c')+(1-a)D P (c,c'). Furthermore, a merger
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implies exit of the unmerged downstream firm. Knowing that V > UNI+DNI, let
us choose E such that
Md NI NIV -E > 11 +
so that non integration cannot be an equilibrium of the merger game. We must
further distinguish two cases:
M M
d d
Case 1: V -E-J < . In this case, everybody likes ex-ante monopolization,
but each would like the other to merge because the integration cost is high.
Ex-anre monopolization is a "public good." While our reduced form for the
merger game yields two pure strategy equilibria ("U -D1 merge" and "U2-D2
merge"), we argue that in this case the reduced form representation of the
game is inadequate. In real time, we would expect a war of attrition. To be
more precise, suppose that all payoffs are flow payoffs (as discussed in the
description of the merger game), and let e denote the flow equivalent of the
M
integration cost at rate r: e - rE. Case 1 can then be described by V -e-J
Md
In the symmetric equilibrium of the war of attrition, each (U.-Di)
randomizes between integrating and not integrating at each instant
conditionally on no one having merged yet. That is, if the game takes place
on [0,+a), the probability of integration by (Ui-Di) between t and (t+dt)
conditional on no merger having yet occurred is xdt, where x is given by
U (V -e -J) VMd NI NI
x - (V -e)-(1 +D ).
r
The left-hand side represents the benefits of not integrating times the
per-unit of time probability that the rival integrates, and the right-hand
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side denotes the gain from monopolizing the industry. The war of attrition is
shorter (x is larger) when the integration cost is larger.
M M
Case 2: V -E-J > U . In this case, each firm prefers to be the one that
triggers ex-ance monopolization. Again, the reduced-form representation of
the merger game is not adequate. In real time, the game would resemble a
preemption game and rent dissipation would occur. To see this, suppose that
the game is played in continuous time, with the payoffs standing for flow
M M
payoffs (thus case 2 corresponds to (V -J-U d)/r > E). Assume that the
market "opens" at date 0, but mergers can occur before date 0. We claim that
some (Ui-Di ) merges at date -T (triggering Dj's exit), where T is such that
(Uj-D.) is indifferent between preempting (U.-Di ) by merging at -(T+e) and
letting (Ui-D i ) preempt:
d d__ _ 39
-E+e-rTv d_-J-U 39r
In equilibrium, the firms' profits from ex-ante monopolization are dissipated
through wasteful early integration.
3 9See Fudenberg-Tirole [1985] for a similar treatment in the context of the
adoption of a new technology and for a full description of the equilibrium
strategies.
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Appendix 8:
Proof of Proposition 20
We argued in the text that, if ~p(Q)(ql - q2) > E, it is a dominant
strategy for U1 - D1 to merge. What is U2 - D2's response? If AP(Q)q2 > E,
then Propositions 16, 18 tell us that, given that D2 invests, U2 - D2 will
prefer to merge than not to merge. Hence either U2 - D2 will integrate or D2
will exit, depending on whether P(Q)q 2 - J - E z (1-~') [P(Q)Q - P(ql)l
(the left-hand side of this inequality represents U2 - D2's profits if they
merge, while the right-hand side represents U2's profits if D2 exits; it is
easy to see that if the LHS < RHS, D2 will choose to exit).
On the other hand, if AP(Q)q2 < E, then if partial integration is viable,
i.e., 6P(Q)q 2 > J, U2 - D2 will not merge. However, if PP(Q)q2 < J ' U2 can
either let D2 exit and make profit (1-') [P(Q)Q - P(ql)ql] or rescue D2 by a
merger and make profit P(Q)q2 - J - E. U2 will choose whichever strategy is
more profitable.
Consider next the case AP(Q)(q l - q2 ) < E. Now U 1 - D 1 's decision to
FI and I  NI
merge will depend on U2 - D2's response. A comparison of V1  (NI + 
D
shows that, given (6.5), U1 - D1 will only merge if U2 and D2 remain
separate, with D2 possibly exiting. In fact we know from (6.2) that D2 's
exiting is a sufficient condition for U1 - D1 to merge. On the other hand,
if D2 remains independent and continues to invest, U1 - D1 will merge if and
only if PP(Q)ql > E, since this guarantees that (U1 - Dl)'s profits are
higher under partial integration than under nonintegration. This yields Case
(C). Q.E.D.
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